WMN: t3_2r0eyf_t1_cnbkcii

[TITLE]

CMV: There is No Free Will

[Microbrewlogic]

With our ever advancing knowledge of neuroscience and the chemistry involved with it, I do not see any place for the idea that any animal, including humans, is truly capable of making choices. We are capable of recognizing choices, that is obvious, but I'm not convinced that the chemical pathways for neurons leaves any room for decisions to be made other than the ones that are made.There is no more room in the chemical pathways for us to "choose" to do anything any more than there is for bacteria or plants to do the same. Chemistry behaves the way it does regardless of what we want it to do, and our decisions are made by chemical controlled signaling between cells. Is there any room for our nerves to come to any other result than the one they do given that chemical pathways we have no control over are the primary factors in the decisions we make? I don't think so, but I'm open to changing my view!

[stratys3]

Just because choices are deterministic doesn't mean choice doesn't exist. The factory down the street from me is run by a deterministic computer program. Just because the program is deterministic doesn't mean it's not "in control" and doesn't "make choices". The fact that certain situations will lead to certain specific outcomes is *irrelevant*.

[ohsnapt]

I wanted to go jump out of an airplane in the sky, so I did. What chemical pathway is responsible for that decision? I think you are getting too reductionist. I mean sure I have no choice whether I breathe or require food or oxygen, but I can choose to waive even that.

[Microbrewlogic]

Can you? It's just nerve signaling in your brain that makes you do these things, ion channels, and when you're making that decision a specific sequence fires that only goes one way and could only reach one outcome.

[nomad005]

What is the point of these debates? I could participate, be told I'm wrong with countless philosophical examples. Or I could choose not too. Free will moving forward in time obviously doesn't exist. Choosing to how react about as much an act of free will as anything. You can choose happiness or sadness. I don't think people should ask this question because I think a lot of people don't understand choice. How you chose to treat people is another act of free.

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm not really convinced you get to choose to be happy or sad for instance.

[brberg]

It seems to me that this argument proves too much, as it's also an argument against the existence of subjective experience (that is, our ability to be aware of our own existence, thoughts, and perceptions). There's no plausible biochemical explanation for this, and yet obviously we do have subjective experience. In fact, as Descartes observed, this is literally the only thing of which any of us can be absolutely certain.

[Microbrewlogic]

To be honest, I've never really been convinced by Descartes on this. "I think I think, therefore I think I am." seems more honest to me.

[brberg]

How can you think if you don't exist? It's possible that you don't exist in the form in which you perceive yourself, but there must something there.

[Microbrewlogic]

We have computers now, so it's much easier to imagine a simulation based scenario where I simply believe that I think than it was in Desecrates time. Simply believing it to be does not necessarily make it so, but I feel that is sort of branching off into a separate philosophical debate.

[IAmEnough]

I wrote an essay on this not too long ago. The consensus in neuroscience is that free will exists but is biologically expensive to exert so most of the time isn't exercised. The psychotherapy literature is also consistent with this view. People are able to engage in psychotherapy and change their thoughts and behaviours, with support and not 100% of the time.

[EquinoctialPie]

You're correct that libertarian free will does not, and cannot exist. Everything we do is determined by the laws of physics. But that doesn't mean we can't make choices. Consider the difference between jumping off of a building, and being pushed off of a building. The first one is a choice because its internally motivated, the latter is not because it's externally forced. Whether that counts as "free will" is really just a question of definitions, but we can certainly make choices.

[edgyasfuck]

You can't prove the unintelligibility of libertarian free will without first proving determinism to be true.

[EquinoctialPie]

Not necessarily. Random chance would not result in free will, it would just result in random events. Whether an event is caused deterministically or randomly, neither would result in libertarian free will. So how else could it work? I've never seen a plausible mechanism for it.

[Namemedickles]

OP is saying that those 'choices' are relatively meaningless concepts given that the decision of whether or not to jump was the end result of external stimuli that produced the mental idea in your mind that you wanted to jump or not jump. There was never an 'option' it was just external cause -> Internal affect -> Action. It was no more your choice to jump than it is a plant's choice to grow towards a light source.

[EquinoctialPie]

And I'm saying it is a meaningful concept, because the how something is caused matters. If you want to stop people from falling off a roof, it can be helpful to know whether people are jumping or being pushed, so you can know whether to invest in suicide hotlines or homocide investigators.

[Namemedickles]

Not even remotely pertinent to what we're talking about. You're way off context.

[Microbrewlogic]

Yes. That's a great clarification. Thank you!

[nyudo2]

People are over complicating this. Of course we are able to choose what we do. I chose so write this response. I'm also going to choose to hold my bladder for another 5 minutes before I go pee.

[Scottmk4]

But because we have so much evidence that humans behave exactly like billiard balls, those choices must be an illusion! /s

[nyudo2]

Side note, instead of peeing, or getting up, I took a nap. Because I wanted to.

[edgyasfuck]

Science has a long way before we can confidently conclude that the universe operates deterministically (i.e., there is only one physical outcome for a given action/event). As /u/PlexiglassPelican mentioned, the Consequence Argument (i.e., we do not have free will if there's an absence of genuine alternative possibilities, or the ability to do otherwise) is compelling, but it only holds water if determinism is proven true. Often invoked here are Frankfurt-type examples, which attribute moral responsibility to an agent given the presence of determinism. However, the problem with those is thinking you have made a free choice is different from actually making a free choice. I believe we have free will, namely event-causal Libertarian free will (see: Robert Kane). This view is an incompatibilist view, meaning free will is *not* compatible with determinism. The crux of the debate lies in whether determinism is true. Until that's proven true or false, the debate will endlessly continue. I'm also surprised no one has mentioned moral responsibility, because that's an important factor in attributing freedom to a choice or action.

[Microbrewlogic]

∆ I agree, those are some extremely convincing points. Honestly, after thinking harder about this, I'm going to have to change it to "I don't know if free will exists, rather than thinking it doesn't exist" You changed my view! :-D Now how do I post a Delta on my tablet? Give me a moment here.

[DeltaBot]

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[Scottmk4]

If free will doesn't exist, then your view can't be changed. This entire discussion, like all discussions, is predicated on the fact that free will *exists*. Any attempt to deny or contradict it defeats itself right off the bat. Only beings will free will can try to deny, contradict, or defend something.

[Microbrewlogic]

No, free will not existing would mean that I would have no choice in my view being changed or not, which is a very different thing. It's about physical determinism, not brains being static constructs.

[Smooth_McDouglette]

A more sinister question comes out of this though. If everything that I do is just a playing out of a series of chain reactions, can we ever really be held responsible for anything that we do? Should we really be encouraged/punished for good/bad behaviour?

[Gottscheace]

Even if there is no free will and all behavior is deterministic, yes. The behavior would follow a feedback loop - encouraging good behavior and punish bad behavior would result in more good behavior and less bad behavior. Additionally, there's a difference between responsibility and fault. If my actions inadvertently harm someone else, and I did not intend to harm this person, I would argue that the harm that affected said person is not my fault. However, because I am the one who harmed this person, rectifying the problem is my responsibility, and would be, regardless of whether or not I actually intended on harming the individual.

[WhenSnowDies]

Neuroscience isn't even close to identifying what free will is. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, or that science accepts absence of knowledge as absence of a phenomena. It's the Dark Matter/Energy of neuroscience. Citing neuroscience for something they're having difficulty even approaching is really sloppy and an abuse of science in general. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and neuroscience is in its infancy; if not a fetus. I find it difficult to take any comment on free will seriously even from those at the top of the field, let alone on the net. I mean this completely seriously: How can you be okay with saying anything on free will and attribute it to anything but your opinion with a straight face? I know that sounds mean but that's not a rhetorical question; do you appreciate how low a tier of knowledge the top scientists in this field really are? I'd encourage you look into Dr. Jordan Peterson's lecture series regarding mental illness and the idea of "being" to mental health. His students have put him on YouTube. He regularly demonstrates how, in practice, most mental illness is the result of consistently choosing to ignore day-to-day existential and biological responsibilities and drives, and using your will to ignore, lie about, and divert actual challenges to live in an ever-growing delusion that eventually crashes at mach 5 into reality. His "reality always catches up" model is extremely compelling, and the ability to cheat even one's self into madness should be an indicator of the existence of free will. He speaks a great deal about common attitudes, drives, and biological motivators, and how people overwrite them all the time and go mad or work to drive somebody else nuts. The idea being that free will is most often used as a bad thing and to work against otherwise clever psychological systems meant to help. The idea that people have the capacity to go insane and work against themselves and their experience should give you pause. Also it doesn't help your thinking-outside-the-box that you don't live in a country or time where people are flayed alive for their beliefs. If you could see the hardcore monks of not long ago, in their efforts to demonstrate the force of their will through denying all bodily everything, and even emotional and intellectual drives, you might be a little slower to falsely associating neuroscience to being conclusive regarding a field it's still figuring out how to scratch. Even a generation ago in India there were swamis that spent their whole lives sedentary, saying and doing nothing. In my world religious study, I met [Rabi Maharaj](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabi_Maharaj), former Indian god who's dad never moved or spoke a word--his father died when taken for a haircut by doctor's orders. Said lifestyle was completely willed and is not uncommon in ego cults in the East and West. Anyway, even if you bloat neuroscience well beyond its current horizons and say that you've found the biological mechanism for choice, that doesn't discount free will because that doesn't ensure the system is predictable or based entirely in reactions within Newtonian physics.

[caw81]

Neuroscience is dependent on chemistry. Chemistry is dependent on atoms. Atoms are dependent on quantum particles. Quantum particles introduces quantum indeterminacy ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacy "Quantum indeterminacy can be quantitatively characterized by a probability distribution on the set of outcomes of measurements of an observable. The distribution is uniquely determined by the system state, and moreover quantum mechanics provides a recipe for calculating this probability distribution.") If the physical state does not completely determine the outcome, only the probability (or chance) of an outcome, then this opens up the opportunity for "free will" to act and determine our actions.

[Smooth_McDouglette]

Quantum indeterminacy does not manifest itself on a macroscopic level though, so it would not come in to play. Demonstrating this fact was the entire purpose of the Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment.

[turtleintegral]

[STA-CITE]> If the physical state does not completely determine the outcome, only the probability (or chance) of an outcome, then this opens up the opportunity for "free will" to act and determine our actions [END-CITE]I disagree with this conclusion. Quantum mechanics arguably removes the possibility of [Laplace's demon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace's_demon), but the randomness of subatomic particles does not say anything about human ability of control. Random processes are just as impossible for humans to control as deterministic ones in terms of human actions and behavior.

[kevintou]

Moving from determined outcomes to probable outcomes doesn't imply free will. It implies randomness. I don't know that this is any better than strict determinism.

[Aninhumer]

The thing is, the macro events we would like to perceive as "choices" are so ridiculously abstracted from the random variables involved in quantum indeterminacy, that to construct a theory of "free will" based on that seems pretty ridiculous to me.

[Microbrewlogic]

I agree with you on this. There could be come effect, but over all I don't yet think there is enough of an effect to really say that there is more than one possible outcome to each "choice".

[Smooth_McDouglette]

This is correct, quantum mechanics cannot be extrapolated to affect behavior on a macroscopic level. That was the entire purpose of schrodinger's cat.

[caw81]

We accept the choices to be based on chemistry. We accept chemistry is based on atoms. We accept atoms are based on subatomic particles (quantum particles). Yet we arbitrary choose to say "this point is where we stop"? What just justification do we have on that?

[Smooth_McDouglette]

As LaoT has said, the variations in positions of quantum particles are not even remotely big enough to play the tiniest effect on a macroscopic construct like the human brain. Hell, once you get up to the level of atoms and molecules quantum mechanics ceases to be a major factor. Think of it like this. Imagine looking at a picture on a monitor that has some incredibly high resolution like 1,000,000 x 1,000,000 pixels or something. You could assign each pixel a probabilistic curve for which color it will be, but when you look at the image it won't appear to be changing because the variation is FAR too subtle.

[Microbrewlogic]

Here's why! Chemistry is based on the interactions between the electron shells of atoms. There is no real mechanism for the changes you're talking about having an impact on the electron shell interactions of those atoms, apart from radioactive decay, which happens at statistically predictable rates.

[caw81]

[STA-CITE]> There is no real mechanism for the changes you're talking about having an impact on the electron shell interactions of those atoms, . [END-CITE]They do study quantum mechnanics on chemistry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_chemistry) so it does have a "real mechanism" on chemistry. [STA-CITE]> apart from radioactive decay, which happens at statistically predictable rates [END-CITE]The "statistical predictable rates" would be in a distribution curve giving a range of outcomes and their probability. This non-deterministic range of outcomes is where free-will can act outside of determinism.

[Microbrewlogic]

Yeah, I did chemistry for a Biopharma company for a long time, and if there was any appreciable outcome of this effect on biochemistry it isn't known to science.

[caw81]

[STA-CITE]> if there was any appreciable outcome of this effect on biochemistry [END-CITE]You assert that its all chemistry based. But chemistry is based on atoms, atoms are based on quantum particles, quantum particles is effected by quantum *indeterminism*. You agree that there are a distribution rates of a range of valid outcomes which cannot be know beforehand deterministically. You say that current science says it doesn't impact biochemistry, but the leading questions in science on this topic is that at best its an open question (e.g. Bell's theorem ) Yet your View says that there is no free-will, which implies its all deterministic.

[Microbrewlogic]

Right, it's the same reason we don't figure out the behavior of deep sea bacteria when studying the sun, it's an issue of scale and mechanism of action. I'm not really sure you're providing justification for either here.

[Smooth_McDouglette]

The thing is that the scale makes all the difference. It's like that old question of what would happen if everyone on earth jumped at the same time. It would have almost 0 effect on the position of the earth. In this example humans are analogous to quantum particles and the earth is analogous to an atom, but even that scale isn't even close to correct. While quantum particles have probabilistic positions, that variation matters less and less the farther out you go because all that matters is that it stays in some relatively predictable quantized location. It's the same reason that in engineering, tools are only engineered to the level of accuracy that is practical and useful. It would not help to have a ruler be much flatter than it already is, it does not need to be a perfect line of atoms with none out of place, because a few out of place has absolutely no perceptible effect on the shape of the ruler. It is enough that it is fairly straight down to a certain level. That's why quantum mechanics is irrelevant on the macroscopic scale, because from where we are (if we could see the particles) they would appear to behave like classical particles, the variations they exhibit are just far far far too subtle to make a meaningful difference to large constructs.

[Aninhumer]

I'm not saying choices can't arise out of those processes, I'm saying that the micro-choices at the root of those processes are too removed from the macro-choices for the two to be meaningfully related. If we are to construct a model of "free will" based on that, we must assume that every conciousness has some kind of god-mind sitting outside the universe carefully calculating the outcomes of a chaotic process in order to guide its macro-will to particular choices. I see that as a pretty preposterous idea.

[caw81]

[STA-CITE]> I'm saying that the micro-choices at the root of those processes are too removed from the macro-choices for the two to be meaningfully related. [END-CITE]It still seems arbitrary. You aren't giving justification except saying its "too removed". [STA-CITE]> If we are to construct a model of "free will" based on that, we must assume that every conciousness has some kind of god-mind sitting outside the universe carefully calculating the outcomes of a chaotic process in order to guide its macro-will to particular choices. [END-CITE]Are we really forced to do this if we accept free-will? Why is it "god-mind"? Why can't it be part of the universe? Why is it actively "calculating the outcomes of chaotic process"? How does it even realize the "chaotic process"?

[parentheticalobject]

If you're going to say that free will exists through quantum interactions affecting neurons, you have to ask how often quantum indeterminancy will actually affect what goes on in a brain. I don't know the exact odds, but it's low enough to be negligible. If it is statistically unlikely that during the course of your life even one of your neurons will fire or not fire due to these effects, then that couldn't meaningfully be a source of free will.

[Aninhumer]

[STA-CITE]>Why is it actively "calculating the outcomes of chaotic process"? [END-CITE]If the entity is able to influence micro-choices such that they result in its desired macro-choices, then it must simulate the results of those choices. If it is not able to do so, then it's no more meaningful to our macro-will than if those micro-choices were random.

[LaoTzusGymShoes]

To say that the choice is arbitrary just assumes that you're right. As far as I know, the levels of indeterminacy that occur on a quantum scale wouldn't have an impact on macro-scale things like the sorts of brain processes that are being discussed here. I'm not an expert, though, could be wrong, I don't follow the field. What's more interesting is that even if determinism is true, which you seem to assume, that still doesn't necessarily tell us if we have free will or not, so I'm really not sure what this whole line of argumentation is about.

[caw81]

[STA-CITE]> To say that the choice is arbitrary just assumes that you're right. [END-CITE]I'm asking /u/Aninhumer what is his justification at stopping at level 4 rather than level 3 or level 2, given what we know today. [STA-CITE]> the levels of indeterminacy that occur on a quantum scale wouldn't have an impact on macro-scale things like the sorts of brain processes that are being discussed here. [END-CITE]But that is what Schrödinger's cat thought experiment tries to address - quantum scale affecting the macro (the cat). As far as I know, the idea behind the experiment is valid and people don't dismiss the experiment because they say "quantum scale doesn't impact the macro".

[Smooth_McDouglette]

It's not so much about which 'level' you stop at, it's more about how much of an effect the underlying level can have on the higher level. In the case of quantum mechanics you're talking about processes that are so unbelievably short and tiny and fast that you simply wouldn't notice random changes on any higher level really (with a few exceptions such as the behaviour of light). In the case of atoms, it's more that the mechanics of how they fit together and why is what is determined by the quantum mechanics. Their position, velocity, charge, and various other attributes are not really affected by the randomness and the lack of impact that randomness has is magnified the higher up you go. For example, a carbon atom will always be a carbon atom as long as it isn't affected by other particles or energy. if Quantum randomness manifested itself on the macroscopic level you would see matter transmuting all the time and that just wouldn't make sense, carbon would be carbon sometimes, then hydrogen at other times. That's not how the universe behaves. It is useful to think about brain chemistry in terms of molecules because the behaviour of the molecules has a **direct, observable** effect on the chemistry, whereas the behaviour of quantum particles does not, outside of laying the framework for the chemistry to exist in in the first place.

[LaoTzusGymShoes]

The cat example uses the cat as an indicator for whether or not one instance of decay has occurred. If the sensor detects it, "arrgh" goes the cat. The cat isn't actually alive and dead at once. I'm not sure if the cat example is really relevant, since there's only one quantum thing happening, and it's being specifically looked for by instruments, rather than having something as complex as brain states from a huge number of quantum events.

[Unknown_One]

Even if the choices we make are influenced by quantum indeterminacy, it is far out of the realm of human understanding and control. What makes it any more free will than determinism?

[safewoodchipper]

yes and on the macro level the probability distribution function collapses into a discrete deterministic value. There are arguments, like the quantum pencil problem, that do show that quantum mechanics can theoretically have macro impacts. However, for us to apply this to neurochemistry we have to propose some sort of model in which quantum fluctuations can "inflate" to the macro scale without being balanced by other fluctuations.

[darthbarracuda]

Are you taking a hard determinist stance or a soft determinist (compatibilist) stance? I would say that even with the knowledge that we likely do not have free will doesn't mean we don't have to make a choice, even if that action is purely an illusion. You still have to take a pseudo-responsibility for your actions.

[sonofaresiii]

The real question is, what *is* free will? You're arguing that it's the conscious's ability to make its own decisions, and that since the conscious is governed by chemistry it's unable to do so, right? But the conscious *is* chemistry. It's not being GOVERNED by chemistry, that's what it is. That's the endgame. Being able to properly react those chemicals in a way that a choice gets made. That's free will. It's not a hindrance to it. It seems to me no different from saying "My blender can't actually blend things, all it can do it spin its little pointy things around really fast to combine liquids." It's the same thing.

[BolshevikMuppet]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmX1W5umC1c

[Empty-Mind]

The issue with any debate on free will is that we really don't have any evidence one way or the other. Neuroscience let's us observe activity in the brain when a 'choice' is made. What causes this activity? It could be predetermined, or maybe the choice you made caused the activity. Really it's up to you to decide which way of looking at it works best for you. It's eerily similar to the debate as to the existence of God.

[lostminty]

In classical mechanics (CM), the 2-body problem is the essence of CM. After that, you need to start using mathematics that inevitably is more appropriate for quantum mechanics. I'll summarise the 2-body/n-body problem for people: 2-body problem is the special case of an n-body problem in which it is non-trivial and can be solved exactly. Anything less, 1-body is trivial, anything more, 3+ body (eg our solar system) is not able to be solved analytically. It requires computers to run approximations which then require more and more iterations to get closer and closer to the answer but never formally reach it. I like that previously in the thread you mention free-will to be between two options "The ability to choose between two things and actually have had the ability to make two choices." I agree, that if you are limited to two bodies, then the outcome is deterministic. However, life is complex and reducing a problem to a 2-body problem takes time which we may not have. Bring in the approximation! with 3-body problems we are constantly guessing which way things will go. It doesn't mean we're right in our guessing. If we truly were deterministic...or lacked free will, why would we ever get things wrong?

[HamSandwich53]

[STA-CITE]> If we truly were deterministic...or lacked free will, why would we ever get things wrong? [END-CITE]A deterministic process is not necessarily a perfect one. We may reach the wrong conclusions sometimes, but that is because the human brain is imperfect and uses cognitive shortcuts to save time and mental effort.

[CleverFreddie]

What do you mean by free will?

[Microbrewlogic]

The ability to choose between two things and actually have had the ability to make two choices.

[Timwi]

Given that, no matter how the universe works, you necessarily always end up making only one of the two choices, how do you define the “ability to make two choices”? It seems to me that it is impossible by definition.

[Aninhumer]

[STA-CITE]>I do not see any place for the idea that any animal, including humans, is truly capable of making choices. [END-CITE]What does it mean to "make choices" anyway? You seem to be presupposing that the only meaningful way to make choices involves some kind of dualist separation of the mind. Personally, as [Compatibilist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism), I don't think such a separation is necessary. Sure, our decisions are the result of physical processes, but why does that make them less meaningful? When I make a choice, I perceive the thought process that leads to it, and I recognise it as my own. A choice is made, and I am the one making it. Why should it matter whether that agency exists outside the rules of the universe? In short: We may not have "free will" but we certainly have "will", and that's all that really matters.

[Microbrewlogic]

I think it makes it less meaningful because there is only one possible outcome to each "choice".

[Aninhumer]

Why does that make it less meaningful? Surely in order for your decision to be meaningful, even at a macro level, it has to be constrained in some way by your personality? Surely there are some choices you would always make, because those choices define who you are?

[Microbrewlogic]

I feel there is a difference between a personality limiting the number of possible outcomes and there simply being only one chemically possible outcome.

[Aninhumer]

But without a dualist other, that chemical process *is* your personality. If your mind exists within the universe, then the single chemically possible outcome of that process *is* your agency.

[Raborn]

The problem ih have with compatibilism, is that I still don't see agency coming into the picture. You're saying choice, but what you mean is "the dominoes fell in the unique chemical soup that is your brain and your body reacted as it must". The difference being that in the way I describe it is that you're just describing a more complex version of a falling object, but what we want when we talk of free will is the falling object to move some way that isn't determined by those DETERMINED physical rails of gravity and drag. If we can find a way choices are made that's deliberate, not random or determined THAT is what we mean, not the compatibilists equivocation of choice.

[ghentyboy]

[STA-CITE]> what we want when we talk of free will is the falling object to move some way that isn't determined by those DETERMINED physical rails of gravity and drag. [END-CITE]That doesn't sound like a free will, but more like a lost will. We need a set of rails (personality, genes, experiences, laws) to make choices, otherwise we'd be stuck in some sort of limbo. So I think it's more productive to rationalize the will we have instead of lamenting a will that can't even exist.

[Raborn]

I agree, however that's not the conversation at hand. Is like saying "well we just shouldn't have marriage at all" when discussing the right to marriage for gay people. A valid point to be sure, but wholly irrelevant given context. I agree with you, it's just not the discussion we're having.

[Aninhumer]

[STA-CITE]>what we want when we talk of free will is the falling object to move some way that isn't determined by those DETERMINED physical rails of gravity and drag [END-CITE]Of course, I understand the difference, but ultimately my question is *why* do you want that? Why does it matter to you that you're "just" dominoes, if those dominoes encode everything that makes up your existence. The way those dominoes fall is every bit a result of your experiences, ideals and personality... every bit a reflection of *you* as if it were external to the universe. There is only one choice you can make, because that is *your* choice. The only way you could make a different choice, is if you were a different person.

[kevintou]

[STA-CITE]>my question is why do you want that? Why does it matter to you that you're "just" dominoes, if those dominoes encode everything that makes up your existence [END-CITE]Why do I want to be more than a passenger? Why do I want to be more than a trapped spectator to my own life? How about to avoid hopelessness and despair? For me, anyway, ignorance was preferable. I wish I could unlearn.

[Aninhumer]

But you're not a "spectator", you're the one who makes all those decisions. The decisions are deterministic only in the sense that they are determined by the person you are. The only choices you can't make are the ones you didn't want.

[kevintou]

It *feels* as if I'm "the one who make all those decsions." The question is whether choice is illusory. If it is, then I'm indeed a spectator: a very complicated, self-aware, biological machine.

[Raborn]

I don't want it to be that way, I'm recognizing it to be that way without additional input. I "want" to have beliefs that accurately reflect reality. [STA-CITE]>The way those dominoes fall is every bit a result of your experiences, ideals and personality... every bit a reflection of you as if it were external to the universe. There is only one choice you can make, because that is your choice. The only way you could make a different choice, is if you were a different person. [END-CITE]You're still just asserting a choice here. Yes, I am a unique flow of chemical reactions in the channel that is physical law, but I am flowing in the channel, not shaping where it goes.

[Aninhumer]

[STA-CITE]> I "want" to have beliefs that accurately reflect reality. [END-CITE]But we're not arguing about reality, we're arguing about the much more subjective definition of "choice" and "will". What's the point in defining "choice" to mean something that can't possibly exist? Why not define it to be the thing that does exist that we actually call choice, i.e. the deterministic process of our own minds in coming to our own unique conclusions?

[Raborn]

Because we're not talking about the colloquial definition here. We're actually talking about the existence of free will, so in that context we must use the version of choice that ACCURATELY DESCRIBES WHAT WE MEAN. If we're going to discuss philosophical free will we cannot bring the other version into the discussion or it will draw the discussion into a fallacy by trying to merge the two. It is, as I have stated, equivocation and it needs to be avoided if we are to stumble upon truth.

[Microbrewlogic]

I see what you're saying there, but I don't think it really makes a case for free will existing.

[Aninhumer]

Well, this is where I ask you to define "free will". If you define it it in a way that's incompatible with determinism, then sure, you can easily say it doesn't exist, but why is that definition more correct than the Compatibilist one? Surely the reason we seek "free will" is because we see a superficial incompatibility between the rules of the universe and our own perception of will, which makes us uncomfortable? Essentially, the point of Compatibilism is that "free will" as it is commonly defined is not necessary to solve this dilemma. You just need to learn to be comfortable with a truly materialist, monist concept of the mind. Which is why I like to phrase it as I did initially: You may not have "free will", but you certainly have "will" and that's all that matters.

[Microbrewlogic]

That's a very good point. I suppose I may not have the ability to make variety of choices in any particular situation, which is how I would define "free will", but I do at least have the ability to make the single choice I am capable of making.

[Keont]

What would be a counter example of this? We seem to behave like this, cothers animals as far as I know do, too, computer are defined as deterministic. So what would an example of the opposite?

[Microbrewlogic]

To have two options presented and the physical ability either identified option.

[Keont]

yeah yeah I understand what you want, I'm asking where can that be found, if we are going down to such a level that we consider thoughts mere atoms interaction.

[Timwi]

“Less meaningful” compared to what? It’s not like some dev has just rolled out an upgrade and now we’ve lost a feature that we used to have. It’s just that we now have a better understanding of how it has always worked all along. So I’m guessing you mean “less meaningful” compared to the misconception that we had in the past when our understanding was less advanced. But that was a misconception; an illusion. It has never really existed, so no point in mourning it.

[MizzKittay]

What do you mean there is only one possible outcome of each choice? Our choices may have to stay within the realm of physical possibility, but they're still complex things. A decision on how to act about a social situation can be a difficult complex choice with many different possible outcomes for any given decision. A decision on a career or relationship or where to live may have many different outcomes. I mean I'm sure you know this so did you mean something else by only one possible outcome?

[Microbrewlogic]

The physical possibility is that there is a single outcome to the function of our brains decision making process. We can identify other options, but we cannot actually choose to do those things.

[zendegee]

Although our central nervous system uses electrical and chemical signaling to communicate between cells and these reactions are deterministic, it is not individual neurons that govern our behaviors or choices. From the network of communicating cells emerges our conscious mind that can choose. It is the emergent properties of the network that are no longer deterministic, i.e. the network is not just the sum of its parts. Albeit, these choices are limited by the constraints of our physiology and the experiences that we have. As well, the habits we adopt do reinforce certain parts of the network which make us more inclined to make given choices. But choices we still make and free will we therefore do have. It is not a limitless free will, e.g. I cannot decide to fly or turn into a button. But I can decide to forego breakfast even if my brain is signaling hunger, or get a tattoo even though it is painful. Furthermore, with every choice I make I can bolster or hinder my capacity to continue to make the choices that I deem more favorable. For example, if I begrudgingly habituate myself to exercising in the morning, then deciding to exercise in the morning becomes an easier choice to make. But I am not bound to this ritual.

[Microbrewlogic]

Do we have any proof that it is "more than the sum of its parts"? Is there a proposed mechanism for why that would be?

[zendegee]

I was using that expression to vaguely describe what an emergent property is. But yes, there are many scientific papers that strive to explain the emergent properties of neural networks, I do not claim to understand all the science behind it. A simple analogy for what I am getting at follows. Imagine a single baseball player on an empty field. Alone, he can throw the ball up and down and that's about it. When a second player joins they can throw the ball to each other, but again that's about it. Once two whole teams arrive, the game of baseball can emerge from the collective. This is something that wouldn't have existed without the collection of 18 players together, as well as the field, lines in the sand, and other systemic attributes. The outcomes of the game are limited by the rules, the field, and the player's individual abilities, but within those limits there are still infinite possible outcomes that could occur. From a complex interaction of many simple parts (players, field, lines, rules, ball, bats, etc), new properties emerge (baseball). Relating this to the brain, neurons, astrocytes, oligodendrocytes, sensory input, motor output, hormones, cytokines, yada yada yada, all make up the complex biological network that is our central nervous system. From this complexity emerges certain abilities, such as memory, plasticity, temporal projection, empathy, etc. From these emerge consciousness and the ability to choose.

[eric4186]

Aren't you choosing to hold this view?

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm not convinced that I had any other choice.

[jumpup]

your forgetting the probability, no brain is identical on neuron scale, and the interactions between thoughts will ensure that the probability anyone else has the same mind as you is virtually nill, so while free will doesn't have much effect its still present,

[Microbrewlogic]

That is a good point. Even if there is only one outcome to each possible choice, that outcome was only possible on my unique situation. That's the most convincing argument I've seen so far! Thank you for the food for thought.

[Raborn]

A unique outcome does not a free will make, just a unique action.

[Microbrewlogic]

That is perhaps an even better point!

[safewoodchipper]

Just because we can describe how these choices are made doesn't mean that these choices aren't being made

[Microbrewlogic]

It does if we can't describe how to make another choice.

[safewoodchipper]

why do you need that to prove free will? Of course you can only make one choice at any given juncture, and just because we can describe the rules that influence these decisions, it doesn't mean that these decisions aren't being made.

[Microbrewlogic]

If we cannot describe how to make a different decision than the one that occurs, then that's akin to saying that objects "decide" to fall due to the influence of gravity without providing for an alternative course of action the object could take. It is just natural laws taking their inevitable course, our input does not matter.

[safewoodchipper]

I think in this case you're making a distinction between the mind and the brain, when in reality they are the same thing. Our input does matter, they are expressed in the very neurological pathways of our brains, there's no differentiation. Yes we are all subject to physical laws, but comparing it to a rock deciding to fall is a bit reductionist. Even though these decisions are following thermodynamics, we are sentient creatures that contain decision-making centers that use chemical relationships to decide things that are (seemingly) most conducive to our self preservation. EDIT: in other words, in your last sentence you are making a distinction between "our input" and "natural laws," but that's the same thing. We *are* manifestations of physical laws, we *are one and the same* with the environment around us, modelling ourselves as actors outside of these laws is the wrong way to approach free will in the first place.

[snowbleie]

Stephen Hawkins once said people who believe there is no free will still look both ways before they cross the street.

[Microbrewlogic]

You know that doesn't make any sense right? What does free will have to do with self preservation? Even bacteria, fungi, and plants take basic actions regarding self preservation, but I doubt anyone would claim they "choose" to do so.

[snowbleie]

You can choose not to look before you cross. It's not an instinct.

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm really not seeing the connection to free will in that argument.

[Aaberg123]

But that's just will vs reaction.

[loveshock]

So either they are wrong and look, or they are right and can't choose not to look. That's a very oddly shallow statement from a usually brilliant man.

[snowbleie]

http://en.m.wikiquote.org/wiki/Stephen_Hawking http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/stephenhaw393342.html http://whoisstephenhawking.com http://thechive.com/2014/08/15/stephen-hawking-quotes-that-highlight-his-true-genius-13-photos/stephen-hawking-quotes-2/ It's in his book: a brief history of time.

[gunnervi]

To build off of what others have said: Let's ignore the physics and chemistry for a moment. Let us instead consider economics. Standard economic theory assumes humans are rational, that is, we always take the action that will maximize our expected utility. This mean that given a set of "choices," there is only ever one that could be "chosen". Does this mean that economics assumes humans have no free will?

[Microbrewlogic]

I've always felt that it tries to skirt the issue of free will through such modeling, but that would make sense. I'm not sure there's much room for free will in a macro-level examination of human behaviors from an economic or ecological perspective.

[ronan125]

It doesn't skip free will in the modeling. It just skips the possibility of individuals exercising their free will in stupid ways

[ADdV]

I had a long, long discussion about this a while back somewhere else on CMV. I personally believe that the fact that choice is a chemical/physical process doesn't take away from the fact that it's a choice.

[turtleintegral]

[STA-CITE]> I personally believe that the fact that choice is a chemical/physical process doesn't take away from the fact that it's a choice. [END-CITE]I have no idea what it means when you are saying that. Sure, you can label human actions as choices, and that's fine, but it's semantics. The real question is whether or not we are controlling those choices or if they happen accordingly to physical processes that humans do not dictate.

[ADdV]

I believe that the physical processes in our brains *are* us. So 'we' are controlling those choices.

[Raborn]

How is a chemical/physical process (the result of deterministic laws) possibly free? Where does choice enter the equation when the equivalent of our actions is rolling a ball down a hill? No choices are made, physical reactions cause it to bounce and turn. Much like our thoughts, external pressures (shape of the slope) determine which direction the ball will roll (thoughts we think) not the ball (us).

[ADdV]

Although I like the metaphor I'm not quite sure if I fully get it. I'd say that the processes that shape the thoughts, the neurons and their electric impulses, *are* us.

[Raborn]

They're the same thing. They're "us" but it's subtly different to say that the water is flowing in the channel thus it's deciding where it's going vs the channel decides. In this case, the "channel" would be the chemical reactions that are decided by physics, not the "water" or us.

[ADdV]

So the thoughts are made by neurons, the water is directed by the channel, and the ball is bounced by rocks. In my view the neurons are us, and if I take the metaphor on, although it doesn't work too pretty, the water and channel are both the river as single 'agent' and the ball and the mountain are together a single agent.

[Microbrewlogic]

How can it be a real "choice" though if there is only one possible outcome?

[stratys3]

It's a choice because it *happens inside of you*. It happens in your mind/brain. It can go in any which way... but just because certain situations lead to certain specific outcomes *isn't meaningful*. I hate to say it, but your unique definition of the word "choice" is meaningless :(

[Microbrewlogic]

It happens inside me, but I wouldn't say that the nervous signals that govern my bowel movements are "meaningful" and that's the same mechanics that govern my "conscious choices" to which there is really only one possible outcome. Why would it be meaningful if there is only one outcome?

[stratys3]

[STA-CITE]> Why would it be meaningful if there is only one outcome? [END-CITE]Why on earth wouldn't it be?!?

[Microbrewlogic]

It's not meaningful because you don't have any say over it. It's just another automatic chemical process, no more special than the acid in my stomach breaking down my breakfast.

[stratys3]

[STA-CITE]> It's not meaningful because you don't have any say over it. [END-CITE]This is clearly false: [STA-CITE]> *The factory down the street from me is run by a deterministic computer program. Just because the program is deterministic doesn't mean it's not "in control" and doesn't "make choices".* [END-CITE]The fact that these choices happen inside your mind - by definition - mean that you are in control and do in fact have say over it. Whether or not it's deterministic *makes no difference* to how much say you have or how much control you have.

[Microbrewlogic]

If you don't have control over your mind, how do you have control over your choices?

[stratys3]

[STA-CITE]> The factory down the street from me is run by a deterministic computer program. Just because the program is deterministic doesn't mean it's not "in control" and doesn't "make choices". [END-CITE]Your mind is like the computer program running the factory. The computer program is in control. Similarly, your mind is in control. [STA-CITE]> If you don't have control over your mind, how do you have control over your choices? [END-CITE]This statement makes little sense to me, and I may need further explaining. You are your mind, and your mind is in control of your choices, therefore you are in control over your choices. *How can it be any other way?*

[Raborn]

Your equivocating in choice. What you mean is "your body takes these actions". Much like when my heart beats, or leg kicks when my knee is struck with a hammer, it's the result of chemical dominoes. Where does the conscious decision actually enter the process? Every thought I have is a chemical chain reaction set off by either previous chemical reactions an known outcomes to those paths, or external inputs that are filter through and cause a reaction. It's no difference than rolling a ball down a hill. The ball is rolling, but the actions it takes are physically determined by the surface it rolls on.

[zevlovaci]

Yeah, program is in control but it cannot make decisions freely. It cannot deviate from what was coded and its future states can be predicted with completely accuracy. Where is free will in this process? [STA-CITE]> You are your mind, and your mind is in control of your choices, [END-CITE]not exactly. I am my brain and I am conscious of few percent of my brain activity (maybe even less). And my consciousness cannot decide on anything. Rather, it is informed on what was already decided and quite literally to deal with it. So yes, brain does make decisions but you have no control in the process, hence there is no free will.

[CleverFreddie]

Because the outcome was the choice. What difference would it make that it could have gone either way? Doesn't that just introduce randomness? How does that show the agent had a choice?

[hardcorr]

Is a man imprisoned if he is locked in a room that he has no intention of leaving?

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm saying he doesn't even get to choose if he has an intention of leaving or not.

[kabukistar]

Reminds me of the joke: Jean-Paul Sartre is sitting at a French cafe, revising his draft of Being and Nothingness. He says to the waitress, "I'd like a cup of coffee, please, with no cream." The waitress replies, "I'm sorry, Monsieur, but we're out of cream. How about with no milk?

[hardcorr]

That's not the point of the question. It's a different way of thinking about what it means to 'choose' something. Yes, you are right in that you could not have chose otherwise. But if you do not actively want to choose otherwise, then some people would say it's still a free choice that you made. A lack of alternatives doesn't take away from the fact that it was a decision, similar to how a lack of freedom might not actually make you not free if you still do the things that you want. Another hypothetical that might help illustrate this idea: Lets say you were going to buy a candy bar for $1. However, unbeknownst to you, I've implanted a chip in your brain and I plan on using it to override your brain and force you to buy the candy if I determine that you are at risk of changing your mind. However, you never change your mind and you buy the candy without me using my behavior override chip. There's no way you could ever not buy the candy bar, but did I force you to do it?

[krysis43ll]

What is being discussed is not a case of chemistry overriding a decision that has been made without chemistry, it's a case of chemistry determining the decision that will be made. In the analogy you made, you have a chip that is distinct from the mind, while chemistry IS the mind. Because of this, I do not think your analogy is apt: for it to be correct, the chip would have to entirely replace the person's mind, so that the person effectively had a chip-mind. I suspect the conclusion one comes to using this analogy would be very different.

[hardcorr]

While consciousness is entirely chemistry, it certainly does not feel like self and chemistry are the same. Do you think every thought that occupies your daily existence maps precisely to a physical brain state? I think it's very easy to imagine the atoms making up your mind as the chip, and your sense of identity and 'will' as something more personal. It's not supposed to be a perfect comparison but rather an illustration of how determined outcomes do not necessarily mean a lack of agency/freedom

[krysis43ll]

I am a materialist, so I do think that thoughts map to physical brain states. What do you propose they might be otherwise? Because I think that thoughts map to physical brain states, it seems to me that your comparison was not only imperfect, but misleading. If I am correct and thoughts do correspond to chemical phenomena, then distinguish the atoms that make up your mind (your chip) from your sense of identity and your "will" is nonsensical. This would mean that your analogy is nonsensical, which is why I have a problem with it being used to illustrate your point. Of course, this all rests on the assumption that thoughts do indeed have physical manifestations, which has hardly been proven (though I'm confident it eventually will be).

[AnMatamaiticeoirRua]

I think the flaw in both of those analogies is that there is some outside force that may or may compel someone. What we're trying to examine is before even that: when someone decides whether or not to leave the room or buy candy.

[hardcorr]

My neural activity feels like an outside force to me. It might be an illusion, but my conscious self doesn't feel to me like a bunch of atoms interacting with each other in my brain.

[Microbrewlogic]

Oh, that is interesting! I guess I think that in that scenario, I didn't really have a choice, I only thought that I did. The fact that I didn't know and came to it on my own doesn't make my choice any more meaningful. Still... That's a scenario I'm going to have to think about for a bit, and I'll probably steal it for a Pathfinder campaign too.

[Mablak]

Those are called Frankfurt cases; these were attempts by Harry Frankfurt to refute the PAP, the principle of alternative possibilities, which (in one of its forms) states that an agent's thoughts can only be freely willed if and only if the agent could've thought otherwise. Since most believers in free will would say that someone's thoughts are freely willed in the candy bar example, the argument is that the normal 'folk' definition of free will (basically libertarian free will) doesn't actually require the ability to think otherwise, and that therefore a compatibilist definition of free will shouldn't require this either. I would say this actually just reveals a major inconsistency in the application of the folk concept of free will, and that even believers in free will couldn't call these decisions freely willed if they gave them some thought. For most actions, most believers in free will would say whether someone could do otherwise is a requirement; the candy bar scenario simply goads believers into adopting another standpoint, i.e. that merely the phenomenological feeling of free will is sufficient to say some thought is freely willed. But ordinarily, this wouldn't be sufficient for *most* believers, and it's simply not their normal criteria. Frankfurt has simply found cases where people are inclined to flip-flop about their criteria for free will. Regardless, even if Frankfurt is correct about free will not requiring the ability to think otherwise, it certainly does require thoughts to be free (uninfluenced by anything) and willed (influenced by certain aspects of a person's personality). A thought can't be both influenced by some aspect of the will, and also uninfluenced by anything, so the normal conception of free will is incoherent. And this in a nutshell is why compatibilism is untenable; it has to use completely different definitions of 'free' and 'willed' that the vast majority of believers don't adhere to, in order to have any sort of 'free will' that's feasible.

[hardcorr]

Yeah. It gets tougher than that example, because in the hypothetical you and I are very distinct entities whereas in regards to free will there's also the question of what your "will" is, whether it's different from your neural activity, and it starts getting into questions of identity. I don't really know whether I disagree with you. I'm glad it got you thinking though!

[urquanmaster]

Just for clarity... Making a choice is simply acting, usually based on observation. Even computer programs make choices. Having only one possible outcome doesn't conflict with the definition of choice. The problem with free will is the idea that we are divorced from reality in a way that our minds are acting on the physical world as a separate, non-physical agent.

[lostminty]

I too disagree. Action and reaction are equal, AND opposite. - Newton.

[Microbrewlogic]

I like that way of looking at things. Very good points! Thank you.

[Raborn]

I really don't agree with this at all. Moving along a forced path is not a choice. If the path I take is the result of chemical dominoes, then there's no choice being made, just physical things acting in a necessary deterministic fashion.

[Timwi]

Well then you’re just arguing the definition of the word “choice”. We all agree that the paths we take are the result of chemical dominoes; whether you want to call it a “choice” or not is just a matter of defining the word. Personally I do call it a “choice” (or a “decision”). It is exactly analogous to a computer program that makes a decision in a game (e.g. a move in chess). The program looks at its options (the valid moves), evaluates them by some metric, and then makes the one it deems “best”. I include that in my definition even if the program has no randomness and will always make the same move when faced with the same situation; therefore, a human brain (which presumably *does* have randomness in it) certainly counts too. If you define “choice” or “decision” in such a way that the above is not included, then it effectively becomes a useless word because you’ve specifically defined it to mean something that cannot exist.

[Raborn]

[STA-CITE]>Well then you’re just arguing the definition of the word “choice”. We all agree that the paths we take are the result of chemical dominoes; whether you want to call it a “choice” or not is just a matter of defining the word. [END-CITE]Well yes, that's an important distinction so of course I'm arguing "choice". The way you're using it implies a free will, even subtlety. [STA-CITE]>Personally I do call it a “choice” (or a “decision”). It is exactly analogous to a computer program that makes a decision in a game (e.g. a move in chess). The program looks at its options (the valid moves), evaluates them by some metric, and then makes the one it deems “best”. I include that in my definition even if the program has no randomness and will always make the same move when faced with the same situation; therefore, a human brain (which presumably does have randomness in it) certainly counts too. [END-CITE] But it's not a free choice, which is the point of contention here. When you come in arguing against someone saying "Well we dont' make choices" and you say "ah hah, but we DO make choices!" that sounds like you're arguing FOR free will. You're not being clear in your communication so I'm trying to clear that up because it muddies the waters around these talks and I find the semantics in THIS case, to be of high importance. If we want to make it clear about what we're talking about, we must say what we mean and not use the same word in a way that could be equivocated or misunderstood. [STA-CITE]>If you define “choice” or “decision” in such a way that the above is not included, then it effectively becomes a useless word because you’ve specifically defined it to mean something that cannot exist. [END-CITE]No, it could exist given the right set of conditions. I just don't know if those conditions exist. Dualism being true would be a good possibility, I just don't think it is.

[Timwi]

I think we have no disagreement about the actual topic. We seem to feel the same way about (the lack of) free will, and we agree on what really seems to go on in our brains when we *think* we “make a choice”. I am not using “choice” in a way that implies a free will; I thought my chess-playing computer demonstrated that. There is no way the deterministic chess-playing computer can be said to have any free will. To the contrary, I thought I defined “choice” in such a way that it *does not* require free will, so that it remains a useful concept in a world in which free will does not exist. [STA-CITE]> Dualism being true would be a good possibility [END-CITE]I don’t really see how dualism can exist. Dualism strikes me as self-contradictory. It seems to claim that there’s a part of “you” (the “mind” or “soul”) that is... somehow not a part of you?... It seems to claim that the “mind/soul” isn’t subject to laws of physics, and yet it exists and does something physical?... I don’t get it.

[Raborn]

Great, I agree with you, however you're entering into the conversation with an irrelevant thesis. That is my objection.

[urquanmaster]

So, what actually makes your idea of choice different than physical things acting in a necessary deterministic fashion? Or, how do physical things acting in a deterministic fashion eliminate the existence of choice?

[Raborn]

[STA-CITE]>So, what actually makes your idea of choice different than physical things acting in a necessary deterministic fashion? [END-CITE]My idea of "choice" could be better labeled as "the outcome/action of a complex chemical computation organism", but much more simply labeled as "action". I think people find it too hard to accidentally equivocate when discussing free will. [STA-CITE]>Or, how do physical things acting in a deterministic fashion eliminate the existence of choice? [END-CITE]Where does the choice of the water come in when it flows down a hill? When a wrench falls to the ground? When a leaf blows in the wind? The objection I see for this is "those are external forces". I can see how it can be seen that way, but really there isn't a boundary for forces. There are, as far as I can tell, 100% physical things going on in our bodies and I cannot ,as much as I try, find a way to really separate how the input to go eat and WHAT to eat, is in any way influenced by a free agent (myself) instead of natural chemical processes discretely thought of as "me". I decide to go eat, but why? I need energy for my body, chemically signaled by the cells. I can choose not to eat (This is short hand for the actions I take, not to be confused with an actual choice. I'm not assuming there is one, but I'm trying to make it clear that I'm not assuming there isn't one either.), but why do I do that if I do? Some other desire, such as to rest which is again chemically signaled by some other part of my body might overpower the desire to eat, or simply not allow the action to occur due to competing signals. tl;dr I'm not aware of anything other than deterministic chemical processes, so I'm not sure where a free will can come from without assuming it does. Believe me though, it really FEELS like my will is free, but I've got this knowledge about the world that makes me wonder. Too many conflicting inputs with outputs in reasoning that make the ultimate decision unresolvable. I'm still looking for the answer, that's why I try to make my position clear so others can help me check it. I can't really improve much better than my own peak, so I've got to get boosts externally :3

[jmsolerm]

The choice is *precisely* what makes all the other outcomes impossible. In which way (that does not include the choice itself) is there only one possible outcome?

[ronan125]

There was some kind of theory I read about that connected this to entropy. When you have a choice, instead of being hard coded to do things automatically, the number of possible outcomes increase. You eating breakfast on time is not the only outcome. You can choose to eat it a different time or not at all. So the evolution of intelligence and free will in a system increases the entropy in the system and thus is keeping in line with the laws of thermodynamics

[Microbrewlogic]

Because you can choose to take option A. You can't actually choose any of the other options, just the one you take.

[jmsolerm]

What do you mean by "can"? I have just gone to the kitchen for some water. But I could have gone for some milk, too. Most people will agree with this, it's a rather basic intuition. In what sense is it *not* true?

[Microbrewlogic]

You couldn't have chosen to get the milk. You recognize the options, but you could not have taken them.

[jmsolerm]

[STA-CITE]>but you could not have taken them. [END-CITE]You have repeated that three times with no explanation. *Why* not?

[Microbrewlogic]

Because your actions are frankly just chemistry. There is no point where your desire to do one thing or another changes the chemical reactions that determine what you do. As a matter of fact, quite the opposite has been shown by scientific experimentation thus far, suggesting that your actions are determined and your brain simply rationalizes the results. You recognize the other options, but you don't get to control which ones you take. Therefore, you have no free will.

[jmsolerm]

[STA-CITE]>Because your actions are frankly just chemistry. [END-CITE]My actions, my desires and deliberations are chemistry. I would put it more accurately, chemistry is *how the desires are implemented*. A robot or alien could have desires in silicon. [STA-CITE]>quite the opposite has been shown by scientific experimentation thus far, suggesting that your actions are determined and your brain simply rationalizes the results. [END-CITE]I think you're referring mostly to the Libet experiment. But the Libet experiment asked the test subjects to pick two buttons *spontaneously*. This is not the same as signing a mortgage. The Libet experiment, as many like it, did not test the choicemaking apparatus and conclude it was faulty. It tested *the random number generator* and concluded it's faulty (if you have neuroimaging systems). [STA-CITE]>You recognize the other options, but you don't get to control which ones you take. [END-CITE]What does, then? It's my brain, processing in accordance to my preferences. That sounds like *me*. I'll ask you something else. What *are* you? Because you seem to be, probably unconsciously, working within the context of a dualist, nonphysical soul, while trying to make sense of a physicalist, determinist world.

[ADdV]

I don't think the fact that there is only one possible outcome is all that relevant, espacially since it's theoretically impossible to know everything. The outcome relies on the exact state of the brain, as well as the exact state of everything that will directly or indirectly affect the brain. This is very obviously practically impossible, but according to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle also theoretically impossible. Edit: the two people who have responded on my behalf while I was typing also make very good points.

[Microbrewlogic]

I'd argue that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a technological limitation rather than a scientific boundary. There's obviously a ton of debate about that though, and my expertise is on a much more macro-level than that. Regardless, it still doesn't change the fact that the choices I make are illusions of choices rather than actual multi-outcome decisions.

[ADdV]

But because your definition of choice includes it being impossible the definition itself is meaningless. Thus, we should take the intuitive meaning of choice as the true meaning.

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm sorry, but that seems like a terribly weak argument akin to "Your views don't fit my own therefore I disregard yours." I've really had my views challenged in this discussion, possibly even changed once I ponder it some more, but this is not how you do that.

[ADdV]

Well my apologies for making it sound as such, I truly didn't mean to. However, this debate always boils down to whose definition of choice one uses, simply because determinism is agreed upon. That's what I meant.

[Microbrewlogic]

It's fine, thank you for clarifying!

[gunnervi]

[STA-CITE]>I'd argue that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a technological limitation rather than a scientific boundary. [END-CITE]Well then, you'd be wrong. While the uncertainty principle is often explained in a way that makes it sound like a technological limitation (e.g., shooting a photon at a particle to measure it's position changes it's velocity), it is a prediction that does not depends on any specific definition of measurement. It is a prediction that follows from the mathematical framework which we use to describe quantum mechanics, which has been shown to be remarkably accurate.

[Microbrewlogic]

Nifty! Thank you for the explanation. I don't mind being wrong half so much as staying wrong.

[throwaway131072]

Let's turn this up a notch and question what we're really getting at here. You're saying that if I had some kind of "save file" of your body and environment at any point in your life, and I knew every law of the universe, that I could tell you every single "choice" you'll make for the rest of your life, therefore you never chose because you were just following laws of physics, right? And that's true, but the real question, if you ask me, is does that matter? I would say not until we have a reason to fear that someone is capable of simulating entire planets with 100% accuracy at a speed greater than realtime, which would inevitably require a planet-sized computer.

[ronan125]

The belief that if a being or computer that knew the exact state of the entire universe completely at any instant would be able to predict everything else that follows and back calculate whatever happened before was pretty much disproved by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Merely by observing, you change things. Every time.

[throwaway131072]

I never said anything about an entire universe, just a planet, nor did I say anything about predicting the past. That being said, absolutely simulating the future with any amount of certainty of a planet-sized system at plank scale, including accounting for the fact that every force on the planet, every footstep, tire tread, landing bird, or falling object induces that force upon every single molecule of the planet, which then impacts every other molecule on the planet with yet another force, would likely require more computing power than could be generated by turning every other piece of matter in the observable universe besides this planet and sun into modern human electronics, even if every component could communicate instantly, rather than at lightspeed. We're talking about a server room the size of a galaxy. (I wonder if the theoretical mass of a galaxy with the average density of a datacenter would be compared to the theoretical mass of the observable universe?) [Volume of Milky Way: 3.3×10^61 cubic meters](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orders_of_magnitude_%28volume%29) [Mass of 42U server rack: 3000 lbs](http://www.newegg.com/Product/Product.aspx?Item=N82E16816228002) Volume = 78.5" x 23.63" x 43.0" = 79763 cubic inches = 1.3 cubic meters Let's assume that there's just over an equal amount of volume of airspace for air circulation, giving the racks and effective volume of 3 cubic meters. 3.3×10^61 / 3 = 1.1×10^61 servers, × 3000lbs = 3.3×10^64 lbs = 1.5×10^64 kg of servers. [Mass of observable universe: 6×10^52 kg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orders_of_magnitude_%28mass%29) Shows how empty galaxies really are.

[Microbrewlogic]

I'm not really sure it matters either. Very good points!

[throwaway131072]

Just some additional thoughts that might let you into some of my PoV, you could either choose to do something now to "break" the "simulation" by suddenly becoming the most perfect person you can be based on who you want to be, then realize your epiphany of "breaking" it was part of the "simulation" all along, and that deciding not to break to break it and continuing to be a merely average person again would just as much have been part of the simulation too, therefore cancelling the involvement of the simulation out of all scenarios regardless. On the other hand, maybe there's some sort of quantum "observer" effect on life itself? Whereas we, by being observers, determine reality. On another note, regardless of that, you, by being nature of consisting of a big chunk of molecules reading this information from a screen (or paper?), are literally a piece of the universe itself, right now. I always enjoy thinking about that one.

[PlexiglassPelican]

I'd go one step further and say that the concept of free will is meaningless in any universe. If you are subject to laws in which cause leads to effect without exception, you cannot have acted otherwise and therefore your will is not free. If you are not subject to such laws, you must be acting randomly (without cause), so your will is not your own. These stand regardless of whether the brain works by neurons or magic. The only distinction that is left to draw is whether or not the causes that are driving your actions can be identified as "you" - the difference between thinking with your own neurons or having your thoughts given to you by some external source. There are coerced and uncoerced actions, but not "free" will.

[ohsnapt]

[STA-CITE]> if you are not subject to such laws you must be moving randomly. [END-CITE] says who?

[PlexiglassPelican]

How else could uncaused motion occur? If it is not random, it must be influenced by something which decides the particular direction of non-randomness it has, whether that thing is a material cause of an immaterial one.

[ProbeIke]

Well, from a physics standpoint this isn't actually true. The laws of quantum mechanics state that there aren't definite positions of particles in the universe, the position of a particle is only known once it is observed. And until it is observed, it's position exists as a probability gradient. Now, most of the time we can predict its location with 0.9999999 percent accuracy, but there is still a chance of something changing (Heisenberg uncertainty) So while physical laws can "restrict" how you think by controlling the way your neurons function and develop, the actual electrical signals (carried by electrons) can differ slightly (*very* slightly) and therefore you can sort of assume that you aren't completely subject to the laws of universal [determinism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism).

[KuulGryphun]

But is a random choice any more free than a determined choice?

[Microbrewlogic]

That is a very good point!

[NeverQuiteEnough]

"What isn't random and isn't deterministic?" is a question I've never heard any sort of answer to.