[TITLE]
CMV: In heaven, as long as an individual has free will and eternal life, they will sin an infinite number of times.
WMN: t3_2rq5g3_t1_cnip9ij--TIO1
Dialogue: t3_2rq5g3
[luxo42]
My argument assumes the Christian theology taught by most non-denominational churches in the USA. Statements 1-3 are primarily taken from this theology. I would rather not argue these points, but rather the philosophy in statements 4-9. However, if there is a better interpretation of Christian beliefs than the one I am presenting, I still would be interested to hear it. Here's my argument. 1. After the events of the current universe have expired, select individuals will go to heaven. 2. The Bible refers to an infinite passage of time in this heaven. e.g. "the righteous will reign forever", "God has given us eternal life" which is taken literally according to the most common Christian interpretation of the text. 3. Every being continues to have free will in heaven. (I realize that this is a point of debate even among Christians, but I would like to pursue this particular line of thought. Assuming the opposite introduces a whole new set of issues.) 4. If a being has free will, then there is the possibility that they will sin. 5. As long as the individual continues to have free will and continues to have eternal life, then the possibility of sin will remain. 6. Given an infinite amount of time, if there is the possibility that something will occur, it will eventually occur.* 7. From (5) and (6), an individual must sin at some point. 8. Since (5) still holds given the immutable conditions for eternal life and residency in heaven presented by the Bible, (6) and (7) still follow. 9. (5-8) can repeated an infinite number of times, so the individual will sin an infinite number of times. (Conclusion) * I realize that (6) is not strictly true. For instance if sin is conditional on something else with a zero probability, then sin could still be possible without actually ever occurring. However I'll maintain that the only condition for sin is free will. In other words, the only condition needed for sin to occur is an individual's ability to choose. As long as this ability remains, then (6) holds. Thanks for reading, CMV. Edit: Several people are responding that free will is not the only requirement for sin to occur. In order for an individual to sin, then there must also be a reason, opportunity, or temptation. Although this would fix the problem, I don't think it is consistent with the rest of Christian theology. The reason is because according to Christianity, the possibility of sin is a requirement for free will to exist. God created a world with the possibility of sin so that its inhabitants could have free will. If there were secondary requirements for sin, as those listed above, then the possibility of sin could be eliminated without removing free will. Then I would ask, why is there sin in this universe? The standard response of, 'so that we can have free will' would no longer be a satisfactory answer. In short, if you propose that there is a secondary requirement for sin beyond free will, then you would need to revisit the question of why sin exists in the first place. Edit2: Thank you all for your responses. I've about exhausted the amount of time I want to spend replying, and I'm sorry that I didn't get to address every point. I do not think my argument is as strong as I originally thought, so I hope to revise it using all the helpful suggestions posted here. Thanks again. _____ > *Hello, users of CMV! This is a footnote from your moderators. We'd just like to remind you of a couple of things. Firstly, please remember to* ***[read through our rules](http://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/wiki/rules)***. *If you see a comment that has broken one, it is more effective to report it than downvote it. Speaking of which,* ***[downvotes don't change views](http://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/wiki/guidelines#wiki_upvoting.2Fdownvoting)****! If you are thinking about submitting a CMV yourself, please have a look through our* ***[popular topics wiki](http://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/wiki/populartopics)*** *first. Any questions or concerns? Feel free to* ***[message us](http://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=/r/changemyview)***. *Happy CMVing!*
[anonoman925]
You will have free will, but your will is going to freely align with god's 100% of the time, or so I'm told.
[Nahguacm]
Sin would not occur in Heaven as the reason we sin is due to a desire or jealous, wrath, etc. that would not occur in Heaven. Heaven is seen as an absolute oneness with God, who would fulfill our desires, thus removing motivation for sin. We would also have nothing to be angry about or jealous of, as Heaven is supposed to be perfect.
[sm0cc]
This view of free will is very strange to me, and I think the issue is in 5-7. You claim that if something is possible for someone then there is a non-zero probability that they will do it. To me that sounds like exactly the opposite of free will! Free will to me means (in part) being able to choose not to do something that I could do. A theological point might help: Heaven will be occupied by those that "abhor sin" and "have desires of righteousness," not by people who secretly desire to sin but are putting off gratification until later. These people may sin now, as Paul says, "because I do not practice what I want to do, but I do what I hate" because of our current "weaknesses of the flesh." The idea of the gospel is that Jesus was sent "so that the just requirement of the law would be fully satisfied for us, who no longer follow our sinful nature but instead follow the Spirit." So if there's no sin in heaven it's because it's self-selecting - the people there don't want to sin and then are given perfect knowledge and self-control. People who would use eternity to sin an infinite number of times go someplace else.
[thewoodenchair]
Ultimately, to sin is to do something that God doesn't allow. It is not inconceivable that once Judgment Day occurs and everyone goes to Heaven, God changes his mind and no longer disapproves of anything you do, meaning that you can no longer sin. All the Bible says about Heaven is that it is (1) far better than life on Earth and (2) a place where one is in communion with God. It doesn't really describe what Heaven is like or what one's conduct will be like in Heaven. How do we know Heaven isn't filled with blackjack and hookers? God changing his mind about stuff is even a theme within Christianity. The Sermon on the Mount is more or less patch notes to the Ten Commandments. Even though keeping the Sabbath is one of the Ten Commandments, Christians generally don't actually keep the Sabbath. Following the dietary requirements like not eating shellfish is also not a part of most Christian sects despite being a part of the Old Testament. It's not a case of God being wrong (which makes no sense in this context) or Jews misinterpreting what God meant about not eating shellfish (although some Christian theologians would argue so); according to Christian theology, God basically changed his mind. So, I believe it's perfectly reasonable for God to change his mind and no longer disapprove of anything.
[cdb03b]
There is nothing in theology that states that free will will continue to exist past death.
[luxo42]
I stated that assumption in the main text. I'm assuming that it does.
[jumpup]
and you are forgetting the nature of heaven, i mean wich sin would you be able to commit envy = you are in heaven, pinnacle of what you can get greed = in heaven your whims are satisfied sloth = eternity means there is never a hurry gluttony = there is no scarcity in heaven and no time limit, so there is no need to be a glutton lust = i doubt heaven has std's or pregnancy's so while this may be a sin on earth doubt it is in heaven wrath = sure in an eternity you could find something to be mad about in heaven, but lets face it if heaven make you mad its not doing a very good job (also you'd have excellent customer support in god) pride= ,you only live for 100 years as human and eternity as something else, while in the beginning you might have some pride, after a millennial or 2 it no longer becomes something worth being proud about
[luxo42]
So you are saying that there is not even the option to sin in heaven. Then I would say that the residing individuals no longer have free will, as they do not have the option to sin.
[Field-K]
There is not even the option to fly on earth. Does that mean the residing individuals don't have free will? Just because some options are unavailable through outside restriction, doesn't mean they don't still have free will.
[jumpup]
they still have, but no longer a reason to
[luxo42]
Following this line of thought, we now have two requirements for sin to occur. The individual must have the ability/option to choose sin, and he must have reason to sin. In order for this individual to have free will, the first requirement must exist, but not necessarily the second. My problem with introducing a secondary requirement for sin is that this causes other problems in the theology. For instance, by taking your stance it would be possible for God to create a world with free will, but no sin. He would only have to remove any reason to sin. Then we could ask why sin exists at all if it is not necessary for free will. Since this is a whole separate discussion, I'd rather stick with the assumption that the only requirement for sin is free will.
[jumpup]
well wasn't the garden of eden without sin before the apple eating? also, if god didn't have the ability to create a world without sin but with free will then he's not omnipotent,
[Field-K]
Ack! No! [STA-CITE]>Given an infinite amount of time, if there is the possibility that something will occur, it will eventually occur.* [END-CITE]No no no, that's not how probability *or* infinite sets work. Example: Suppose I have a bag with infinitely many integers inside, and infinite time. Each hour, you pull an integer from the bag. For any integer you can think of, there is a possibility that you will pull it from the bag. *But* that doesn't mean you will. Instead you could pull 2 on the first hour, 4 on the second, 6 on the third, etc etc pulling even numbers each time. You never run out because there are *also* infinitely many even numbers, so in this scenario you never draw the number 1. It was possible to draw, but it didn't *have* to be drawn. This isn't even mentioning the fact that there is more than one 'size" of infinity. The real numbers are infinite of at least an order larger than the integers (and so are called "uncountable" to contrast our ability to count integers). If you had a box the size of the integers, you could *never* fit all the real numbers into it at once! Suppose you pick a random real number between 0 and 1 in decimal expansion, i.e. you pick a random infinite decimal such as 0.12500... or 0.333... . (This is the same as picking infinitely many digits). 2 is a possible digit, but 0.333... doesn't have 2 as a digit! Just because something is possible, doesn't mean it will occur *even in infinite time*. An example better fit for your problem: It is possible that, given infinite time, I will choose to eat chocolate ice cream after dinner. But maybe I just decide on vanilla every night. I could eat vanilla ice cream after dinner every night ad infinitum. The event of me eating chocolate ice cream would then never have occured, despite it being possible.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>No no no, that's not how probability or infinite sets work. Example: Suppose I have a bag with infinitely many integers inside, and infinite time. Each hour, you pull an integer from the bag. For any integer you can think of, there is a possibility that you will pull it from the bag. But that doesn't mean you will. Instead you could pull 2 on the first hour, 4 on the second, 6 on the third, etc etc pulling even numbers each time. You never run out because there are also infinitely many even numbers, so in this scenario you never draw the number 1. It was possible to draw, but it didn't have to be drawn. [END-CITE]I think you are misinterpreting the math behind my argument. Maybe I wasn't clear, so let me try and explain how your example isn't what my argument is saying. If you had all the integers in a bag, the probability of you drawing a 6 is p=1/(infinity)=0. However, in my argument, I hold that the probability of sinning has a finite value. It can be made arbitrarily small, but must remain greater than zero. This would correspond to drawing from a finite set of numbers n, so that that probability of drawing any particular number is 1/n. In this case, if we conduct an infinite number of trials, we would expect that drawing x would approach a relative frequency of 1/n. If sinning has some probability of p, then the probability of not sinning after x number of trial will be (1-p)^x. Since 1-p is less than 1, we can see that this number will approach zero as x goes to infinity. The rest of your post assumes selection from a infinite set. But like I said, since the set I'm drawing from is finite, then the probability of any *finite* sequence will converge to 1 as the number of trials goes to infinity.
[Field-K]
I have two issues with this: first and foremost, why should the probability of sinning have a non-zero value? You have not demonstrated this at all. Second, that still isn't how probability works. [STA-CITE]>In this case, if we conduct an infinite number of trials, we would expect that drawing x would approach a relative frequency of 1/n. [END-CITE]"Expect" is not the same as "occurs". I could flip a coin infinitely many times, and you might expect that half the time you would get tails. But it isn't out of the question to get heads every time. it would be unexpected, but not impossible. [STA-CITE]>If sinning has some probability of p, then the probability of not sinning after x number of trial will be (1-p)x. Since 1-p is less than 1, we can see that this number will approach zero as x goes to infinity. [END-CITE][STA-CITE]>The rest of your post assumes selection from a infinite set. But like I said, since the set I'm drawing from is finite, then the probability of any finite sequence will converge to 1 as the number of trials goes to infinity. [END-CITE]When you take a limit of probabilities some weird things happen. Probability zero events can still occur. Probability 1 events can wind up not occuring. There is zero probability that you will get infinitely many heads in a row when flipping a coin ( take 0.5^x as x goes to infinity ), but it is still clearly a possible outcome. As a matter of fact, in my example about the bag of integers, the limiting probability of pulling any single integer is zero! But obviously you will pull one of those integers the first time, despite having probability zero of doing so. [This](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost_surely) wiki article does a decent job of describing this phenomenon with other examples. TL;DR Zero probability is not the same as impossible, or conversely probability one is not the same as guaranteed.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>I have two issues with this: first and foremost, why should the probability of sinning have a non-zero value? You have not demonstrated this at all. [END-CITE]I agree I need to come up with a better argument for this. Originally it was just, 'in order to have the ability to choose x (from a finite set), there must be some non zero probability of choosing x.' However, I have no proof for this other than it seems intuitively true to me. [STA-CITE]>"Expect" is not the same as "occurs". I could flip a coin infinitely many times, and you might expect that half the time you would get tails. But it isn't out of the question to get heads every time. it would be unexpected, but not impossible. [END-CITE]If you are being strictly rigorous then yes, it is possible to get heads every single time. However generally it is not necessary to distinguish between almost certain and certain, or almost impossible and possible. For instance, it is almost impossible that the white house will quantum tunnel through the earth to China. However, no one would raise an eyebrow if I called it impossible. [STA-CITE]>When you take a limit of probabilities some weird things happen. Probability zero events can still occur. Probability 1 events can wind up not occuring. There is zero probability that you will get infinitely many heads in a row when flipping a coin ( take 0.5x as x goes to infinity ), but it is still clearly a possible outcome. As a matter of fact, in my example about the bag of integers, the limiting probability of pulling any single integer is zero! But obviously you will pull one of those integers the first time, despite having probability zero of doing so. [END-CITE]I understand all this, but it doesn't matter to me if the outcome is less than absolutely certain. It doesn't even have to be mathematical. We could say that getting at least one tail on an arbitrarily large number of flips is the empirical result of numerous tests, and I have decided to be use this result in my argument. Or if you want to change my conclusion to say that the prediction most likely to be correct is that everyone will continue to sin an infinite number of times, then I am fine with that too.
[Field-K]
[STA-CITE]>I agree I need to come up with a better argument for this. Originally it was just, 'in order to have the ability to choose x (from a finite set), there must be some non zero probability of choosing x.' However, I have no proof for this other than it seems intuitively true to me. [END-CITE]That isn't really what you are doing though. You are not just choosing x from a finite set. You are choosing x_1, x_2, x_3, ad infinutum from a finite set. Every time you act, you choose from the set {sin, not sin} making infinite choices. Making one choice from a finite set does need to have non zero probability, but you are really making an infinite string of choices from a finite set. Which is like choosing an infinite string from the set of all infinite strings whose entries are "sin" or "not sin". So in reality, you are choosing from an infinite set. You just phrased it as choosing from a finite set infinitely many times. [STA-CITE]>If you are being strictly rigorous then yes, it is possible to get heads every single time. However generally it is not necessary to distinguish between almost certain and certain, or almost impossible and possible. For instance, it is almost impossible that the white house will quantum tunnel through the earth to China. However, no one would raise an eyebrow if I called it impossible. [END-CITE]You're right, it is generally not necessary to distinguish between almost certain and certain. But your argument hinges so strongly on conflating the two to draw a contradiction that it cannot be justified. It would be better to say "heaven is improbable" given your approach. (and yes, I would personally raise an eyebrow and protest if you claimed it was impossible for the white house to quantum tunnel to China. It is merely improbable, and I believe even has a non-zero probability. As I understand this is a pretty important distinction in quantum mechanics, that the probability distribution doesn't just end.) [STA-CITE]>I understand all this, but it doesn't matter to me if the outcome is less than absolutely certain. It doesn't even have to be mathematical. We could say that getting at least one tail on an arbitrarily large number of flips is the empirical result of numerous tests, and I have decided to be use this result in my argument. [END-CITE]Unfortunately it does need to be mathematical. We are working with the difference between improbable and impossible, and empirical results by nature cannot show something is impossible, only improbable. [STA-CITE]>Or if you want to change my conclusion to say that the prediction most likely to be correct is that everyone will continue to sin an infinite number of times, then I am fine with that too. [END-CITE]This is a good conclusion. Unfortunately, you lose the contradiction here. This merely shows that heaven is improbable, but not necessarily impossible. Improbable things do happen, all the time. And since we are discussing heaven as being created by an omnipotent being who can do all things which are possible, it is absolutely acceptable for heaven to be improbable yet exist. Edit: to match your phrasing, I mean "a heaven in which no one sins is improbable, but not necessarily impossible" by your argument
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>That isn't really what you are doing though. You are not just choosing x from a finite set. You are choosing x_1, x_2, x_3, ad infinutum from a finite set. Every time you act, you choose from the set {sin, not sin} making infinite choices. Making one choice from a finite set does need to have non zero probability, but you are really making an infinite string of choices from a finite set. Which is like choosing an infinite string from the set of all infinite strings whose entries are "sin" or "not sin". So in reality, you are choosing from an infinite set. You just phrased it as choosing from a finite set infinitely many times. [END-CITE]I completely disagree that this is what I'm doing. Like you said, we are drawing from the set of {sin, not sin} infinite times, and the result will be an infinite string of {sin, not sin,.... } You could make a new set that contains all the possible infinite strings that might result. Each one of these strings has a probability of zero. I am not saying that any one of these infinite strings will occur or is likely to occur. What I am saying is that the probability that 'sin' occurs somewhere along the sequence approaches 1 as the number of trials goes to infinity. There are an infinite number of sequences in which this occurs. So if you want to say that I am choosing from an infinite set, then you could say that I am choosing an infinite number of objects from an infinite set (actually all of them except one, {not sin, not sin, not sin,..} if I want to just say that you will sin at least once in heaven) For an example, let's say that we can choose from the set of integers 1 through 10 an infinite number of times. What is the probability of drawing a 6 at least once? 1. What is the probability of never drawing a 6? 0. What will actually happen, at least with all the certainty we are allowed? We will draw a 6, and every other number, an infinite number of times. That is the mathematical beef of my argument, although it remains to be proven whether or not our choice to sin can actually be modeled in this way. [STA-CITE]>You're right, it is generally not necessary to distinguish between almost certain and certain. But your argument hinges so strongly on conflating the two to draw a contradiction that it cannot be justified. It would be better to say "heaven is improbable" given your approach. [END-CITE]It may be just semantics, but to me improbable means that we can assign some arbitrarily small number to the probability that an event will occur. [STA-CITE]> (and yes, I would personally raise an eyebrow and protest if you claimed it was impossible for the white house to quantum tunnel to China. It is merely improbable, and I believe even has a non-zero probability. As I understand this is a pretty important distinction in quantum mechanics, that the probability distribution doesn't just end.) [END-CITE]I actually agree with you, I was just using it as example of something that is very improbable that we normally consider impossible. [STA-CITE]>Unfortunately, you lose the contradiction here. This merely shows that heaven is improbable, but not necessarily impossible. [END-CITE]Can you specify exactly which premise fails? I still don't see how it makes a difference. To me this seems more of an epistemological problem that would apply to almost any argument that wasn't a prior. I can't see how it relates to my argument in particular. [STA-CITE]>Unfortunately it does need to be mathematical. We are working with the difference between improbable and impossible, and empirical results by nature cannot show something is impossible, only improbable. [END-CITE]Like I said above, I think we need to clarify exactly what part of my argument fails in order to see this.
[Field-K]
[STA-CITE]>I completely disagree that this is what I'm doing. Like you said, we are drawing from the set of {sin, not sin} infinite times, and the result will be an infinite string of {sin, not sin,.... } You could make a new set that contains all the possible infinite strings that might result. Each one of these strings has a probability of zero. I am not saying that any one of these infinite strings will occur or is likely to occur. What I am saying is that the probability that 'sin' occurs somewhere along the sequence approaches 1 as the number of trials goes to infinity. There are an infinite number of sequences in which this occurs. So if you want to say that I am choosing from an infinite set, then you could say that I am choosing an infinite number of objects from an infinite set (actually all of them except one, {not sin, not sin, not sin,..} if I want to just say that you will sin at least once in heaven) [END-CITE]No, you misunderstood what the strings represented. They represent *every* choice a person makes over their infinite time in heaven. The choice is choosing the one string that gives you all of that person's choices. The first entry is the first choice, the second entry the second choice, and so on. You only *choose* one string. There is probability 1 that it belongs to the collection of strings with at least one "sin" entry, but you still only choose one string i.e. one list of all the person's choices. See below for why this still only shows improbable, but not impossible. [STA-CITE]>For an example, let's say that we can choose from the set of integers 1 through 10 an infinite number of times. What is the probability of drawing a 6 at least once? 1. What is the probability of never drawing a 6? 0. What will actually happen, at least with all the certainty we are allowed? We will draw a 6, and every other number, an infinite number of times. That is the mathematical beef of my argument, although it remains to be proven whether or not our choice to sin can actually be modeled in this way. [END-CITE]Probability 1 does not mean garunteed. In your example, there is probability 1 that you will choose 6 at least once. But it is not garunteed as it is still possible for all your choices to be 1 or 2. [STA-CITE]>It may be just semantics, but to me improbable means that we can assign some arbitrarily small number to the probability that an event will occur. [END-CITE]That is what it means, but that's still a far cry away from "impossible". [STA-CITE]>I actually agree with you, I was just using it as example of something that is very improbable that we normally consider impossible. [END-CITE]Cool! Sure, we normally conflate the two notions because we treat the universe as if it obeys statistical laws. Highly improbable things almost never happen. But the big problem with that is that you are starting with Christian theology, which states that heaven is created by an omnipotent God. However you define omnipotent, at the very *least* it means God can do anything that is possible. Heaven without sin being improbable, but not impossible, means just about nothing when a "God who can do all things which are possible" makes it. [STA-CITE]>Can you specify exactly which premise fails? I still don't see how it makes a difference. To me this seems more of an epistemological problem that would apply to almost any argument that wasn't a prior. I can't see how it relates to my argument in particular. [END-CITE]You tried to argue that something for certain was impossible (that nobody sins in heaven). But your argument only shows that it is improbable (by nature of using probabilistic methods). Improbable, but as far as we know still possible. Because in Christian theology heaven is created by an omnipotent being who can do all things which are possible, it is insignificant to say heaven is improbable. The Christian God can create improbable things with ease. Heck, even without assuming the existence of a god, improbable things happen, just not very often. Heaven without sin could be one of those instances. This is a common fallacy employed against evolution without god. The claim is that the probability that this particular universe, this particular planet, and the particular chain of mutations that occurred is so incredibly low that it couldn't have happened by chance. But, as I'm sure you'll agree, that just isn't true. Among all other possible universes ours may be improbable, but that doesn't mean impossible. [Here's](http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Improbable_things_happen) an article with more examples. Edits: Decided to elaborate more on some points
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]> No, you misunderstood what the strings represented. They represent every choice a person makes over their infinite time in heaven. The choice is choosing the one string that gives you all of that person's choices. The first entry is the first choice, the second entry the second choice, and so on. You only choose one string. There is probability 1 that it belongs to the collection of strings with at least one "sin" entry, but you still only choose one string i.e. one list of all the person's choices. [END-CITE]We agree on what the strings represent. I don't exactly agree that I am picking one string, since I'm not specifying the particular sequence that he chooses. But I can see how you could frame the problem that way, so I'll accept this model. Regardless, I am not making any prediction about which specific string is actualized, just that the finite sequence "sin" occurs somewhere in the actualized string. We agree that this will occur with a probability of one. [STA-CITE]>Probability 1 does not mean garunteed. In your example, there is probability 1 that you will choose 6 at least once. But it is not garunteed as it is still possible for all your choices to be 1 or 2. [END-CITE]If someone gives you a million dollars to bet, how much of it would you bet that you will get at least one 6? You would bet all of it. You are as certain as you can possibly be that there will be at least one six. [STA-CITE]>Cool! Sure, we normally conflate the two notions because we treat the universe as if it obeys statistical laws. Highly improbable things almost never happen. But the big problem with that is that you are starting with Christian theology, which states that heaven is created by an omnipotent God. However you define omnipotent, at the very least it means God can do anything that is possible. Heaven without sin being improbable, but not impossible, means just about nothing when a "God who can do all things which are possible" makes it. [END-CITE]In my opinion everything gets messy when you give God omnipotence, so I didn't assume this in my argument. He could just make a heaven with free will and no sin and nothing could stop him. He doesn't have to even abide by math necessarily. You are right though, I should have specified that from the start. ∆ [STA-CITE]>You tried to argue that something for certain was impossible (that nobody sins in heaven). But your argument only shows that it is improbable (by nature of using probabilistic methods). Improbable, but as far as we know still possible. Because in Christian theology heaven is created by an omnipotent being who can do all things which are possible, it is insignificant to say heaven is improbable. The Christian God can create improbable things with ease. [END-CITE]Yes, God's omnipotence does make my argument fall, even though it causes some collateral damage to Christian theology. I still don't see the need to distinguish between the improbability of flipping an infinite sequence of heads, and just calling it impossible. Even though it is theoretically possible, at any point in time we could just wait longer if we hadn't yet come across a tails. But maybe I'm just being stubborn on this point. [STA-CITE]>Heck, even without assuming the existence of a god, improbable things happen, just not very often. Heaven without sin could be one of those instances. This is a common fallacy employed against evolution without god. The claim is that the probability that this particular universe, this particular planet, and the particular chain of mutations that occurred is so incredibly low that it couldn't have happened by chance. But, as I'm sure you'll agree, that just isn't true. Among all other possible universes ours may be improbable, but that doesn't mean impossible. [END-CITE]The evolution example and others are all examples of very unlikely events. The possible events that could have occurred, although enormously huge, is still finite. We still get a non-zero value for the probability. Going back to the integer example. We must pick an integer from the set of all integers. All integers have a probability of 0, yet one of them has to be picked. Now I'm not even sure if I believe this. It seems true, because I feel like I could just pick any number. But if I pick a number, am I really considering the whole set, or just a piece of it? Let's say I had a computer do the job for me. When would it decide to pick a number? Would it ever stop deciding? I know I'm wrong in this, but I can't convince myself why.
[Field-K]
[STA-CITE]>Regardless, I am not making any prediction about which specific string is actualized, just that the finite sequence "sin" occurs somewhere in the actualized string. We agree that this will occur with a probability of one. [END-CITE]You are making a prediction though, you are predicting that the string which is actualized has "sin" in it. This has probability 1, but is not garunteed because there is still one other string (without sin) that could be actualized. [STA-CITE]>If someone gives you a million dollars to bet, how much of it would you bet that you will get at least one 6? You would bet all of it. You are as certain as you can possibly be that there will be at least one six. [END-CITE]As certain as possible, yes. Garunteed, no. I would make that bet because it would be a good bet, but it's not impossible that I could lose. [STA-CITE]>In my opinion everything gets messy when you give God omnipotence, so I didn't assume this in my argument. He could just make a heaven with free will and no sin and nothing could stop him. He doesn't have to even abide by math necessarily. You are right though, I should have specified that from the start. [END-CITE]I mean, hell, you can't even have a discussion within Christian Theology without an omnipotent god. You aren't going to convince any Christians that heaven is impossible that way ;) [STA-CITE]>I still don't see the need to distinguish between the improbability of flipping an infinite sequence of heads, and just calling it impossible. Even though it is theoretically possible, at any point in time we could just wait longer if we hadn't yet come across a tails. But maybe I'm just being stubborn on this point. [END-CITE]But you've said it yourself, it is theoretically possible. Thus not impossible. Waiting longer does not garuntee a tails will occur, it only becomes more probable [STA-CITE]>Going back to the integer example. We must pick an integer from the set of all integers. All integers have a probability of 0, yet one of them has to be picked. Now I'm not even sure if I believe this. It seems true, because I feel like I could just pick any number. But if I pick a number, am I really considering the whole set, or just a piece of it? Let's say I had a computer do the job for me. When would it decide to pick a number? Would it ever stop deciding? I know I'm wrong in this, but I can't convince myself why. [END-CITE]The difference between you theoretically picking a number at random and a computer picking a number at random is exactly what you stated - are you considering the whole set? A computer can only perform a finite number of operations, and so can never truly pick a random integer from among all integers. It will always have a bound. Technically neither can you, we don't live forever after all. But we can model probabilities in infinite sets by creating systems which obey similar laws. This is usually done by a [Probability measure](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_measure). I encourage you to read the article, it's fascinating stuff. But I'll summarize. A probability measure assigns a probability (a real number between 0 and 1) to a subset of your space (the set you are choosing from). That represents the probability that your choice ends up inside of the subset. This function must obey a few rules, but most important for this discuss are these two: the probability of the whole set is 1, and the probability of the union of disjoint subsets is the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint subsets. This intuitively makes sense, the probability of choosing a number between 0 and 20 should be the sum of the probabilities of choosing between 0 and 10, and between 11 and 20. The nice part is that we allow this addition to work for (countably) infinitely many disjoint subsets as well! (There are important reasons for this in Measure theory, but I digress). Suppose every possible choice in an infinite set had non-zero probability, say greater than p[STA-CITE]>0. Take countably many or them, now the probability that you choose one of these countably many is the sum of infinitely many p>0. But if you sum a non zero number infinitely many times, you get infinity!! This can't happen because the probability of the whole set is 1 and you can never get bigger than that. This contradicted our assumption that every possible choice had probability >0, thus at least one possible choice must have probability 0. [END-CITE]It's hard to wrap you mind around the first you hear of it. If you delve deep enough into physics, math, probability, or logic you find that common intuitions just fail at certain levels. I'm constantly learning things that I can't believe at first, forcing me to restructure my understanding of the material.
[DeltaBot]
Confirmed: 1 delta awarded to /u/Field-K. ^[[History](/r/changemyview/wiki/user/Field-K)] ^[[Wiki](http://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/wiki/deltabot)][[Code](https://github.com/alexames/DeltaBot)][[Subreddit](http://www.reddit.com/r/DeltaBot/)]
[____Matt____]
Using your definition of "free will", just like infinite monkeys with infinite typewriters might only produce a long string of the letter "A" for eternity, people could produce an infinitely long strong of non-sin actions for eternity. Who is to say the extremely improbable (approaching zero) probability this occurs for every being in heaven is not possibly going to be the case? It'd be pretty ridiculous, but yet still actually possible. Infinity and probability are strange things, and perhaps this insanely unlikely outcome occurs for every person who makes it into heaven; it could theoretically happen, and there would be no issue with "free will" being violated here. "6" is certainly not true even if the only condition needed for sin to occur is the individual ability to choose; it's just very likely to be the case. With that said, I would suggest it's entirely possible to have "free will" and yet be incapable of choosing to sin. "Free will" is about having a free choice, and you can have a free choice between two "good" options without a "bad" counterbalance of any kind. Saying that you must also be free to pick an sufficiently bad option if you have a choice is probably wrong; you can totally have a choice, even a free choice, between various forms of exercise without including "stabbing someone to death" as a possible exercise choice (let's say, in a reality where that's physically impossible). One example would be that you have an infinite number of choices, but none of them involve sin. Even if you have a finite number of choices, and you can freely choose, and none of them involves sin, is this not still "free will"? And of course, an omnipotent being could create a world with "free will", but where one cannot sin; it could shape every facet of reality such that only certain actions were possible / such that certain actions were not possible.
[luxo42]
I agree with almost everything you said. I cannot say with absolute certainty that an infinite chain of non-sin decisions will not occur, but I can say it will not occur with all the confidence that I am allowed. I don't find this to be critical to my argument, for the same would be true of any conclusion that we could reach. Also, you are using a different definition of free will. I define free will specifically as the ability to choose to sin (or not sin). Of course limiting options does not remove the ability to choose in general.
[Omega037]
What you are really getting in your CMV is something similar to the [Monkeys with Typewriters theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_monkey_theorem), where all possible written works would be produced if given infinite time. However, just like this theorem is predicated on the assumption that the monkeys have typewriters, your view is heavily predicated on the assumption that the physical form goes to heaven, rather than just one's soul (which it doesn't). After all, most of the potential sins are physical in nature, and are therefore impossible for a soul form to engage in. The remaining sins (jealousy, believing in other gods, etc) are similarly unlikely to occur in a situation where one has no unfulfilled desires and complete oneness with God.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>The remaining sins (jealousy, believing in other gods, etc) are similarly unlikely to occur in a situation where one has no unfulfilled desires and complete oneness with God. [END-CITE]It doesn't matter if they are unlikely or how little remaining sins are a possibility. If there is only one possible sin left, and it has the tiniest possibility of occurring, every free-willed being will commit this sin and commit it an infinite number of times. Zero is the only number that can compete with eternity. The only way to keep sin from happening is to reduce its probability to zero.
[almightySapling]
[STA-CITE]>It doesn't matter if they are unlikely or how little remaining sins are a possibility. If there is only one possible sin left, and it has the tiniest possibility of occurring, every free-willed being will commit this sin and commit it an infinite number of times. [END-CITE]This is false and *completely* contradicts the notion of free-will. The fact is, I have *choice*. I can *choose* never to commit a given sin. Just because it is possible for me to commit it does not mean that I must: this is a key difference between probability as a model and reality itself. If it were necessary for every being to commit each possible sin infinitely (or even once) then we have no free will, for we would be slaves to some mathematical machine. And this is why the Monkey Typewriter conjecture fails: monkeys are not perfectly random. It may be possible for them to type up the works of Shakespeare but if every monkey devoutly avoids the letter E, then they never will, even in infinite time. Of course, none of this matters in reality, as sin is bound to our mortal selves. In heaven, there is no sin to be committed. Edit: more mathematical curiosity: The digits of pi, or e, or any irrational number, are without pattern. They march on into the infinite, and for most of them, each digit is likely to occur (not necessarily with the same probability) at any point. Something oft-quoted, but not necessarily true, is that you can find any finite string of digits in pi, if you look far enough. However, we don't know this is true, and it is possible that it is false. There is a bit of analogy here as well: the digits are infinite, and they have non-zero probability of occurring, but there is no guarantee, even mathematically, that they will form every arbitrary pattern you desire. Edit edit: more math! Let's continue looking at decimal expansions! Numbers can be written in any base, so let's look at binary real numbers between 0 and 1, including 1 only once (that is, include 0.1111... and exclude 1.000...) What we actually have is a sequence of 0s and 1s. Now we classify actions: 0 for sins, 1 for non-sins. Thus, for every path a person chooses (free will!) to take in heaven, we can assign them exactly 1 number from the reals between 0 and 1. Granted, it is true that almost all (measure 1) of these outcomes is sinful. But, because of free will, every single person in heaven can choose an eternity that correlates to .111... that is, an eternity free from sin. The number is in the set. If, for some reason, each of these numbers was equally likely to occur (mathematically impossible) then we are left with some absurdity: every possible outcome, chosen from the set, is just as unlikely to occur as the rest, so you can't use that argument to discount the possibility that, indeed, 0.111... is chosen. Can heaven have sin? Sure, maybe. But *your* mathematical arguments are flawed and lacking in rigor.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>Just because it is possible for me to commit it does not mean that I must: this is a key difference between probability as a model and reality itself. If it were necessary for every being to commit each possible sin infinitely (or even once) then we have no free will, for we would be slaves to some mathematical machine. [END-CITE]So you are saying that certain mathematical and logical rules don't apply in heaven? [STA-CITE]>And this is why the Monkey Typewriter conjecture fails: monkeys are not perfectly random. It may be possible for them to type up the works of Shakespeare but if every monkey devoutly avoids the letter E, then they never will, even in infinite time. [END-CITE]Do the monkey's have a choice to hit E? [STA-CITE]>Edit: more mathematical curiosity: The digits of pi, or e, or any irrational number, are without pattern. They march on into the infinite, and for most of them, each digit is likely to occur (not necessarily with the same probability) at any point. Something oft-quoted, but not necessarily true, is that you can find any finite string of digits in pi, if you look far enough. However, we don't know this is true, and it is possible that it is false. [END-CITE] There is no guarantee, because we do not know if the probability of some digit or pattern becomes zero after some point. It is not true that we know the probability of any string of digits remains greater than zero. With sin in heaven, I argue that we know that the possibility of sin is dependent on free will, and as long as free will exists, the possibility of sin will never be zero. I think a better example is that of flipping a coin. In any particular flip of the coin, there is a 50% chance that you will get tails. You might be tempted to say that after an infinite number of flips, you could possibly get all tails. This however is incorrect. Mathematically, if you flip the coin an infinite number of times, you will get example the same number of heads as you get tails.
[almightySapling]
[STA-CITE]>So you are saying that certain mathematical and logical rules don't apply in heaven? [END-CITE]No, I'm saying you are misinterpreting math. (Edit: I should note that while I did not say this nor mean to imply it, I see no reason why it shouldn't be true. God itself is a logically inconsistent idea, so it is fitting that his domain be as well) [STA-CITE]>Do the monkey's have a choice to hit E? [END-CITE]Yes, they do, but their free will prevents them from doing so, that's the whole point. [STA-CITE]>I think a better example is that of flipping a coin. In any particular flip of the coin, there is a 50% chance that you will get tails. You might be tempted to say that after an infinite number of flips, you could possibly get all tails. This however is incorrect. Mathematically, if you flip the coin an infinite number of times, you will get example the same number of heads as you get tails. [END-CITE]More examples of your misunderstanding of probability and outcome: the flipping coins example is actually isomorphic to my binary decimal experiment: let heads and tails be 0 and 1. You flip forever and you generate a string, infinitely long, of H and T. If you think that, at the end of this process, both H and T must have occurred equally as often, then you are wrong. There are exactly as many potential outcomes (strings of H and T) as there are real numbers. One of these outcomes is all H. Another outcome is all T. Another outcome is perfectly alternating HTHTHT... And each of these is just all likely to occur as any other. So, your premise that a human randomly choosing to sin or not sin does not lead you to the conclusion that they must sin, not even mathematically. But the premise itself is also flawed because free will is not the same as random chance: I can, by my choice and my choice alone, deliberately choose to set down the penny Heads up, **every. single. time.**
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>More examples of your misunderstanding of probability and outcome: the flipping coins example is actually isomorphic to my binary decimal experiment: let heads and tails be 0 and 1. You flip forever and you generate a string, infinitely long, of H and T. If you think that, at the end of this process, both H and T must have occurred equally as often, then you are wrong. [END-CITE]It does due to the Law of Large numbers. [Here is a pdf of the proof and further discusses the topic](http://maxim.ece.illinois.edu/teaching/fall12/handouts/LLN.pdf) Here is also a [video](https://www.khanacademy.org/math/probability/random-variables-topic/expected-value/v/law-of-large-numbers) on Kahn academy that discusses this very example. Basically if the probability of x occurring is p, then after n trials we can expect x to occur with a relative frequency of p as n goes to infinity. [STA-CITE]>There are exactly as many potential outcomes (strings of H and T) as there are real numbers. One of these outcomes is all H. Another outcome is all T. Another outcome is perfectly alternating HTHTHT... And each of these is just all likely to occur as any other. So, your premise that a human randomly choosing to sin or not sin does not lead you to the conclusion that they must sin, not even mathematically. [END-CITE]The probability of any one particular outcomes goes to zero as we increase the number of trials. The probability of any *infinite* sequence HHHHH..., TTTTT..., or HTHTHT... are all zero. However the probability that we encounter any *finite* sequence approaches one. Since my argument does not depend on one particular infinite sequence occurring, so I'm not sure where your objection lies. [STA-CITE]>But the premise itself is also flawed because free will is not the same as random chance: I can, by my choice and my choice alone, deliberately choose to set down the penny Heads up, every. single. time. [END-CITE]This seems to be the main point of contention. I would say that if the probability of you choosing tails is zero, then you cannot choose tails, i.e. you lack free will. Admittedly my argument for this is weak at this point, because to me it seem inherently true. Let me take some time to think of a proof, and then I'll get back to you.
[almightySapling]
You seem to be conflating some mathematical notions. The *probability* of any particular outcome is 0, but obviously *one outcome must occur*. There is a difference, even if you choose not to recognize it, between an event with 0 probability and an event that is impossible. You are also misinterpreting probability as some absolute notion of truth. The Law of Large Numbers does not, as you state, guarantee that every outcome with non-zero probability must occur. It simply states that the likelihood of such an event occurring tends to 1. And, like an event with 0 probability can occur, an event with 1 probability is not *factually* guaranteed to occur. It is merely immensely likely to occur. Basically, you seem to think that probability makes any sort of statements about what will happen, but it doesn't. It merely makes predictions. So that's just my explanation for the math side of things, something I am well versed in. I hate asking for trust in a debate, but you are quoting math that you don't quite understand and making interpretations about it that don't actually exist, and I don't really know what else to say other than sorry, but you are wrong about this. As for the last bit, about free will. It seems absolutely assinine that you would describe my choice to never do something as having a 0 probability of occurring (because that's not how probability works) and then to *further* conclude that that means I have no free will is just completely ass-backwards. Your model dictating that I *must* sin is devoid of free will as it dictates my actions. The righteousness that I exercised to get in to heaven will guide me to make sinless choices for the rest of eternity, because I choose to remain sinless. You also never responded to my earlier point about sins not being possible to commit in heaven because the notions of sin itself doesn't even exist there: every action in heaven is virtuous.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>You seem to be conflating some mathematical notions. The probability of any particular outcome is 0, but obviously one outcome must occur. There is a difference, even if you choose not to recognize it, between an event with 0 probability and an event that is impossible. [END-CITE]Yes I understand this much. I don't think it makes a difference to my argument. If you would rather I say that something has a probability of zero rather than be impossible, then that is perfectly fine with me. [STA-CITE]>The Law of Large Numbers does not, as you state, guarantee that every outcome with non-zero probability must occur. It simply states that the likelihood of such an event occurring tends to 1. [END-CITE]I understand this too. If you would prefer I say that the probability of an individual sinning is 100% instead of certain, that's fine by me. [STA-CITE]>Basically, you seem to think that probability makes any sort of statements about what will happen, but it doesn't. It merely makes predictions. [END-CITE]Sure. I'll say that with all the confidence allowed to me, that an individual will sin. It seems like you are just arguing that I'm not being rigorous with my language. That is fair, but it doesn't really address the meat of my argument. [STA-CITE]>So that's just my explanation for the math side of things, something I am well versed in. I hate asking for trust in a debate, but you are quoting math that you don't quite understand and making interpretations about it that don't actually exist, and I don't really know what else to say other than sorry, but you are wrong about this. [END-CITE]It seems like your only objection is that a probability of 1 doesn't mean absolutely certain and 0 doesn't mean impossible. I already understood this much, but didn't see the need to make the distinction. Do you have any other objection besides this? I don't know everything but if you tried to explain I think I could understand. [STA-CITE]>As for the last bit, about free will. It seems absolutely assinine that you would describe my choice to never do something as having a 0 probability of occurring (because that's not how probability works) [END-CITE]I don't think I ever said that. I said that if there is no possibility to do X, then you can't choose to do X. I don't see how this is assinine or even that controversial. [STA-CITE]>and then to further conclude that that means I have no free will is just completely ass-backwards. Your model dictating that I must sin is devoid of free will as it dictates my actions. [END-CITE]Alright, it is not necessary for you to sin, but the probability of you sinning approaches 1 as time goes to infinity. Do prefer this version any better? [STA-CITE]>The righteousness that I exercised to get in to heaven will guide me to make sinless choices for the rest of eternity, because I choose to remain sinless. [END-CITE]So another poster here changed my view about this slightly. To avoid starting a duplicate conversation, would you mind just joining our conversation instead of starting a new one here? I gave him a delta so it should be easy enough to find. If you aren't satisfied with what was already posted, I'll be more than happy to start a new conversation with you. [STA-CITE]>You also never responded to my earlier point about sins not being possible to commit in heaven because the notions of sin itself doesn't even exist there: every action in heaven is virtuous. [END-CITE]I'm sorry. I've been answering responses all day, but I still missed some. In response, I would say in that case it is impossible to sin in heaven in the strongest sense. Then as long as we know that it is impossible to sin, we cannot choose to sin in heaven. Again, I talked about this elsewhere and would prefer not to go through it again. Perhaps you could respond to a post where I already addressed this?
[almightySapling]
[STA-CITE]>Yes I understand this much. I don't think it makes a difference to my argument. If you would rather I say that something has a probability of zero rather than be impossible, then that is perfectly fine with me. [END-CITE]It makes all the difference. Your argument is making assertions about what *will* happen, not about what *may* happen. Considering heaven is already a place of fantasy, it should not be a huge jump to imagine incredibly unlikely things happening there. [STA-CITE]>I understand this too. If you would prefer I say that the probability of an individual sinning is 100% instead of certain, that's fine by me. [END-CITE]Again, your entire argument falls apart when you recognize this distinction. [STA-CITE]>Sure. I'll say that with all the confidence allowed to me, that an individual will sin. It seems like you are just arguing that I'm not being rigorous with my language. That is fair, but it doesn't really address the meat of my argument. [END-CITE]The meat of your argument is that you claim to have proven mathematically that heaven is sinful. Which you agree, here, now, you don't have. You have, at best, heaven is *likely* sinful. Which is meaningless. [STA-CITE]>It seems like your only objection is that a probability of 1 doesn't mean absolutely certain and 0 doesn't mean impossible. I already understood this much, but didn't see the need to make the distinction. Do you have any other objection besides this? I don't know everything but if you tried to explain I think I could understand. [END-CITE]If you already understood this, and chose to ignore the distinction, then you have committed an awful sin: misrepresenting statistics to sell a view. [STA-CITE]>I don't think I ever said that. I said that if there is no possibility to do X, then you can't choose to do X. I don't see how this is assinine or even that controversial. [END-CITE]Correct, you didn't exactly state this. However, when I said that I would never choose to sin, you responded by saying that sin therefore had a 0% chance to happen, and thus restricted my freewill. I trust that you can see how I made this conclusion from such a response. However, it is flawed, probabilistically speaking, to look back on my choices after the fact and say that because I never sinned, sinning was impossible for me to do. Sinning was possible, I chose to refrain. This is the essence of free will, and the whole point of life on earth. [STA-CITE]>Alright, it is not necessary for you to sin, but the probability of you sinning approaches 1 as time goes to infinity. Do prefer this version any better? [END-CITE]I do prefer this, because it is completely counter to your original claim, in which you state that every person will necessarily sin. As for the rest, I will look through the thread for the relevant discussions.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>It makes all the difference. Your argument is making assertions about what will happen, not about what may happen. Considering heaven is already a place of fantasy, it should not be a huge jump to imagine incredibly unlikely things happening there. [END-CITE]I don't understand this. It seems like you are saying that incredibly unlikely things are likely to happen in heaven, which seems strange. If you are just saying that incredibly unlikely things might happen in heaven, I agree. But incredibly unlikely things also might happen here on earth, so I don't see your point. [STA-CITE]>However, it is flawed, probabilistically speaking, to look back on my choices after the fact and say that because I never sinned, sinning was impossible for me to do. Sinning was possible, I chose to refrain. This is the essence of free will, and the whole point of life on earth. [END-CITE]From my perspective, I see a coin that lands heads up an infinite number of times. It would be reasonable for me to suspect that the coin is rigged to always land heads up. [STA-CITE]>I do prefer this, because it is completely counter to your original claim, in which you state that every person will necessarily sin. [END-CITE]My original claim was that every person will sin. I am willing to change that to every person will almost surely sin. How are these completely counter to each other?
[Omega037]
Sorry, there is a bit of confusion here. My use of "similarly unlikely" was not meant to imply a low probability, it was rhetorical (since the unlikelihood that they were "similar" to was zero). How about you enumerate the sins that you think would still have some probability of happening in heaven and we can go through on an individual basis.
[FoxxBait]
What about lying? Unless there is zero communication once a soul reaches heaven, there is the possibility for someone to tell a lie. And if there is a possibility to tell a lie (even a small possibility), then OP is saying that, given infinite time, a lie will be told.
[Omega037]
As demonstrated in the story of Eden, lying is not inherent to humans but is a result of embarrassment or desire. A soul that is one with God would have neither.
[FoxxBait]
I think you're rationalizing human conditions, such as the propensity to lie, with biblical text. People can lie for almost any reason, even with the intention of helping another. But, you're also making the implication that there is always a reason for people to lie. That there is always some sinful root cause to a lie. I argue that people, in general, sometimes lie for no more reason than because they want to. Better yet and more to the point, if I wanted to lie in heaven, are you suggesting that I could not? Is not free will the power to make my own choices for no more reason than because it is the way I think I should proceed with my life? I argue that there is a distinct difference between taking away the desire to do something and taking away the ability to do something. You've argued that there would be no desire to lie, but you've said nothing about the inability.
[Omega037]
Actually, the ninth commandment is not really about lying in general but bearing false witness. More specifically: [STA-CITE]> Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor [END-CITE]Other portions of the bible dealing with the issue explicitly state that this deals with testimony/legal matters, and only pertains to perjury for malicious intent. Thus, I would argue that it is impossible to commit this sin in heaven because you are not ever participating in a legal matter. Since God is omniscient, there would be no need for testimony.
[FoxxBait]
If you're trying to tell me that lying is only a sin if it's in regards to legal matters, I'm not buying it. http://www.gotquestions.org/Bible-lying-sin.html http://www.gotquestions.org/right-to-lie.html Both of those links reference scripture on how/why/when lying is a sin and it's not limited to "legal" matters. And, on top of that, you've changed your argument from "you can't sin in heaven" to "lying is only a sin with regards to legal matters and thus couldn't happen in heaven." To this new argument, I'll respond with the question of whether or not it is possible for two souls to make any sort of deals, pacts, or promises to each other of any kind in heaven. And, if promises are plausible, could one not lie about them given his free will?
[Omega037]
Honestly, arguing any of this further is pointless since we are both right depending on assumptions. Unfortunately since there is no way to empirically test what heaven is like, we can simply assert what we think things are like in a way that confirms our opinions. I could even make it tautological by making the assumptions that "nobody who sins goes to heaven" and/or "heaven is a place where sinning can't happen."
[luxo42]
Before we get into specifics, let's assume that any sin I can come up with has zero probability of happening. For an example, let's say that there is zero probability that I could envy the person siting at God's right hand. If there is a zero probability of me experiencing this envy, would you agree that I do not really have the choice to be envious of this person?
[Omega037]
You can not be able to do things and still have free will.
[stevegcook]
What do you think of this article? It seems like a plausible answer to your concerns. http://www.comereason.org/free-will-in-heaven.asp Tl;dr upon entering heaven, the soul changes and becomes godly in nature, such that you do not wish to sin. Sin is not just dependent on free will, but also on an imperfect soul, as someone with a perfectly pure soul will not sin, even if they have it within their physical capacity to do so.
[luxo42]
This somewhat answers my concerns, but results in either an altered definition of free will or a very arbitrary definition of sinless. The author states that God has free will, yet does not sin. In our godly state we would replicate this characteristic in heaven. First of all, I disagree that God has free will in the same sense that we do. If sin is defined as going against God's will, then by definition God cannot sin without contradiction. In order to sin, God would have to stop being God. In other words, God is sinless by definition. If this characteristic is applied to heavenly beings, then we would no longer be able to sin. Whatever action we chose would consequently not be sin by definition. We would lose the ability to choose to sin, and therefore lose our free will. I also have a problem with the counter argument that states: 'we have the ability to sin, but we just choose not to'. This would only work if there is only a finite passage of time. If there is zero possibility of us sinning, then we do not have the ability to sin. Since we have the ability to sin (via free will), then there must be a non-zero possibility of us sinning. It might be infinitesimally small, but mathematically, given an infinite passage of time, it must occur.
[rigamortus76]
[STA-CITE]>If sin is defined as going against God's will, then by definition God cannot sin without contradiction. [END-CITE]Yes, I think that's the point. [STA-CITE]>We would lose the ability to choose to sin, and therefore lose our free will. [END-CITE]By this logic, you would agree we don't currently have free will either, since we can't choose to sin in ways we have no capacity to think of, right? [STA-CITE]>Since we have the ability to sin (via free will), then there must be a non-zero possibility of us sinning. It might be infinitesimally small, but mathematically, given an infinite passage of time, it must occur. [END-CITE]I have the ability to punch my friends in the face, knock then out, spoon their brains out into serving dishes, add whipped cream, and serve it to the poor. Do you think that if we existed forever it means I necessarily *must* do this?
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>By this logic, you would agree we don't currently have free will either, since we can't choose to sin in ways we have no capacity to think of, right? [END-CITE]I would say that the ability to do any one particular sin is all that is required for free will. Certain sins are unavailable to me, but as long as the set of available sins doesn't become zero, I still have free will. [STA-CITE]>I have the ability to punch my friends in the face, knock then out, spoon their brains out into serving dishes, add whipped cream, and serve it to the poor. Do you think that if we existed forever it means I necessarily must do this? [END-CITE]If the possibility of punching your friend remains non-zero, and is not conditional on something with a probability of zero, then yes you would eventually do this. Think of it this way. You have a choice to pick either A or B. If there is a zero probability to choose B, then you really do not have a choice. You must choose A. If there is a probability that you could choose B (and A), then you may choose A or B. Now let's say that this decision is presented to you an infinite number of times. Since we said that choosing A or B must have a non-zero probability in order for you to have a choice, then mathematically you must choose both A and B eventually.
[rigamortus76]
[STA-CITE]> I would say that the ability to do any one particular sin is all that is required for free will. [END-CITE]That is a bizarre definition of free will. I guess if you want to use that definition, then it's true that if we can't sin then we don't have free will. But realize what you're doing here. [STA-CITE]>If the possibility of punching your friend remains non-zero [END-CITE]I didn't say anything about the possibility. I said I have the "ability" to do it. I used that word because that's the word you used. Having the ability to do something doesn't imply that there is a non-zero probability of ever doing it, right? It simply doesn't logically follow. Unless you're going to define "ability" to mean "has a non-zero probability of happening". But then, if you're just going to do that for everything, then there's actually not much to debate.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>That is a bizarre definition of free will. I guess if you want to use that definition, then it's true that if we can't sin then we don't have free will. But realize what you're doing here. [END-CITE]Even though it looks strange, I think that my definition is the same definition used in most Christian theologies. Consider the common response to the question, 'why did God create a universe that contains sin?'. The answer is generally, 'because this was necessary in order for us to have free will.' In other words, the possibility of sin is a necessary condition for the existence of free will. Do you agree so far, or have I interpreted their theology wrongly? [STA-CITE]>Having the ability to do something doesn't imply that there is a non-zero probability of ever doing it, right? [END-CITE]I think that it does. In my choosing A or B example, if there was 0 probability to choose B, then you cannot choose B. If you cannot choose B, then you lack the ability to choose B.
[rigamortus76]
I don't agree that you have the theology right, but I'm not going to argue it because there are so many interpretations, you can really make it whatever you want. So if you want to define free will that way, I'm fine with that. [STA-CITE]>if there was 0 probability to choose B, then you cannot choose B. [END-CITE]I'm not sure I agree with this. I could choose to intentionally drown my cat. But I choose not to. There is 0 probability that I will choose that option, even though the option is available to me. It's not that I *can't* choose it, but that I *choose* not to, using this free will thing. I think this gets to the meat of our disagreement. I'm saying that our ability to choose something doesn't logically necessitate that we must eventually make that choice. You're saying it does. In the end I think it's just the definitions you're using, again: To you, 0 probability of choosing option B means there is no ability to choose B. To me, 0 probability of choosing option B could also mean I would never choose that option. Let me try to lay these out in logical form, in a universe where only options A and B exist. The argument you presented goes like this: * (p1) Free will exists: I have the ability to choose either A or B * (p2) The probability of my choosing B is 0 * (p3) 0 probability means I don't actually have the ability * (c1) Therefore, I have no ability to choose B (which contradicts p1) So one of your premises must be wrong. We agree on p2 so one of p1 or p3 must be wrong: Either Free will doesn't exist or 0 probability can't mean I don't have the ability to choose B. Here is my argument: * (p1) Free will exists: I have the ability to choose either A or B * (p2) My will is such that I never desire to choose B * (c1) Therefore, the probability of my choosing B is 0 As a matter of full disclosure, I actually don't think we have this kind of libertarian free will at all, I'm just arguing on that basis because it's how you originally presented it.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]>To you, 0 probability of choosing option B means there is no ability to choose B. To me, 0 probability of choosing option B could also mean I would never choose that option. Let me try to lay these out in logical form, in a universe where only options A and B exist. [END-CITE]I agree that this seems to be the crux of the matter. To put the problem in my own words, your viewpoint establishes two requirements for sin to occur, the ability to sin and the desire to sin. Free will is only dependent on the ability to sin not the desire to sin. Hypothetically, under your viewpoint it is absolutely possible for sin to never occur without any damage to free will. We would only have to remove the desire to sin. In other words, the ability to sin is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sin to occur. I'll talk more about this later, but first I want to clarify the relationship between the ability to choose X and the probability that X could occur. If we can reach a consensus on whether X must have some probability of occurring (perhaps a conditional one) in order to have the ability to choose X, then it will make our discussion easier. Consider the following hypothetical situation. Scientists have been working to establish a cure for alcoholism. They find a drug that when taken orally, completely removes the desire for alcohol. Alcoholics can voluntarily take this drug, and many do. As these people carry on with their lives, the opportunity to drink arises occasionally, but none fall to the temptation because they have no longer have the desire to drink. We would not however say that these people are being forced not to drink, or have lost the ability to drink. They simply choose not to. I believe that this is the same situation you are proposing. People can choose to enter heaven freely, just like the alcoholics can choose to take the pill. Once they enter heaven, they no longer have the desire to sin even though they have the ability to sin. Now here is my version of the scenario, which I believe provides a more fitting analogy. Consider a similar hypothetical situation, but in this case scientists have adopted a different strategy. They decide to send any volunteers to a distant planet where there is no alcohol nor any way to make alcohol. The volunteers can freely choose to go, but once they have arrived, it is impossible for them to return. After they make the initial decision, they lose the ability to drink alcohol. They can no longer even make that choice. In order to resolve the issue, I believe we have to explain why the volunteers lose their ability to choose in the second scenario, but not the first. In my view, it is because we remove the possibility for the volunteers to choose alcohol in the second situation. The removal of this possibility necessitates the loss of their ability to choose. I think you disagree, so perhaps you can explain why you think the volunteers retain their ability to choose in one scenario, but not the other. [STA-CITE]>We agree on p2 so one of p1 or p3 must be wrong: Either Free will doesn't exist or 0 probability can't mean I don't have the ability to choose B. [END-CITE]In my argument, I would say that p2 must be wrong. I want to hold p1 and p3 to be true, so my only other option is to abandon p2. Regarding your argument, I would say that your conclusion contradicts with p1. Starting from your conclusion, (p1) The probability of choosing B is zero. (p2) If I have the ability to choose B, then there is some possibility that I will choose B. (C) I do not have the ability to choose B. I assume you will disagree with (p2), so I think we need to resolve this first before we can go any further. Edit: formatting
[rigamortus76]
[STA-CITE]>In order to resolve the issue, I believe we have to explain why the volunteers lose their ability to choose in the second scenario, but not the first. [END-CITE]The thing is, they haven't lost the ability to choose in either scenario. They simply can't follow through and carry out their choice in the second case. It's like, if I decide to drown my cat and fail at it, I still chose to drown my cat. I can choose to do any impossible thing I want. I'll just fail. [STA-CITE]>In my view, it is because we remove the possibility for the volunteers to choose alcohol in the second situation. [END-CITE]You haven't removed their possibility to choose. You've only removed the possibility for them to satisfy or act on their choice. It seems like you believe that if you haven't the tools to carry out what you decide, that means you can't make the choice. But that's clearly not the case. If I choose to drink a decaf coffee and you give me a regular coffee, you've tricked me, but my free will hasn't been violated, even if no decaf coffee exists at all - I still made the choice freely. [STA-CITE]>I think you disagree, so perhaps you can explain why you think the volunteers retain their ability to choose in one scenario, but not the other. [END-CITE]Hopefully the above goes some way to satisfy this. But this seems a shift... I wasn't arguing that you could or couldn't choose something you had not the ability to carry out. I was arguing that your *ability to choose* something doesn't necessitate that you *must choose* it. [STA-CITE]>In my argument, I would say that p2 must be wrong. I want to hold p1 and p3 to be true, so my only other option is to abandon p2. [END-CITE]You established p2 as a critical premise when you said "*If there is a zero probability to choose B, then you really do not have a choice.*" If you take p2 out of your argument or make it anything but what it is, you no longer have a logical argument at all, since p3 follows only if p2 is true. It doesn't address the contradiction, it just breaks the logic. You end up with this: * (p1) Free will exists: I have the ability to choose either A or B * (c1) Therefore, I have no ability to choose B Clearly c1 doesn't follow from that premise. [STA-CITE]>I would say that your conclusion contradicts with p1. [END-CITE]I don't see how you showed a contradiction in my argument and I don't see how that new argument is valid at all or what it has to do with mine. You just inserted a premise (p2) with your previous conclusion embedded in it. That premise is what we're trying to establish the truth of in the first place. And the conclusion doesn't logically follow in any case.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]> The thing is, they haven't lost the ability to choose in either scenario. They simply can't follow through and carry out their choice in the second case. It's like, if I decide to drown my cat and fail at it, I still chose to drown my cat. I can choose to do any impossible thing I want. I'll just fail. [END-CITE]You raise a good point with this and your coffee example, and made me change my view partially. ∆ Perhaps you've changed my view on the whole subject, but let me flesh out this line of thinking first. If the volunteers on the island were fooled into thinking some drink is alcohol, then they could choose to have a drink without actually being able to. However, then it seems that free will becomes a problem of epistemology. If the volunteers know that they can't drink alcohol, then they can't make the decision to drink it. If you know that you can't drown your cat, then you can't decide to drown your cat. You can make a decision without being successful, but only if you believe that there is some chance that you can actually carry through. Then I would ask, could we believe that we have the ability to sin in heaven, without actually having the ability? Also wouldn't most Christians say that the conscious decision to sin is a sin in itself regardless of whether or not the sin is successfully carried out? [STA-CITE]>But this seems a shift... I wasn't arguing that you could or couldn't choose something you had not the ability to carry out. I was arguing that your ability to choose something doesn't necessitate that you must choose it. [END-CITE]Ok so perhaps I misunderstood you. Could you explain again why you think this is true. [STA-CITE]>You established p2 as a critical premise when you said "If there is a zero probability to choose B, then you really do not have a choice." If you take p2 out of your argument or make it anything but what it is, you no longer have a logical argument at all, since p3 follows only if p2 is true. It doesn't address the contradiction, it just breaks the logic. You end up with this: [END-CITE]To remind ourselves, (p2) said "The probability of my choosing B is 0". I did not propose this anywhere, you put it in your interpretation of my argument which I disagree with. It is critical to my argument that (p2) is false. Now it is true that I said, ""If there is a zero probability to choose B, then you really do not have a choice." This was (p3) of the argument. As I'm sure you know, taking the contrapositive of any statement results in a statement logically equivalent to the first. So taking the contrapositive of "If there is a zero probability to choose B, then you really do not have a choice" we get "If you have a choice, then there is a non zero probability to choose B" Since I want to say that we do have a choice, then there must be a non zero probability of choosing B. In the argument from your previous post, we can replace (p3) with its contrapostive. Then if we hold that (p1) and (p3) must be true, then (p2) must be false from a simple argument using modus ponens. P1: If F, then A and B. P2: F P3: B C:~(~B) Where F=an individual has free will, and B=there is a probability that this individual chooses B. [STA-CITE]>I don't see how you showed a contradiction in my argument and I don't see how that new argument is valid at all or what it has to do with mine. You just inserted a premise (p2) with your previous conclusion embedded in it. That premise is what we're trying to establish the truth of in the first place. And the conclusion doesn't logically follow in any case. [END-CITE]I agree, that I assumed (p2) to be true without any logical proof. However the conclusion does follow logically if we assume (p1) and (p2) to be true. Look at my argument again. (p1) The probability of choosing B is zero. (p2) If I have the ability to choose B, then there is some possibility that I will choose B. (C) I do not have the ability to choose B. or P1: ~B P2: If A then B (or ~B then ~A by taking the contrapositive) C:~A (by modus ponens) But anyways, it seems like we are making progress elsewhere in the discussion, so I'm willing to drop this argument if you are.
[stevegcook]
[STA-CITE]>First of all, I disagree that God has free will in the same sense that we do. If sin is defined as going against God's will, then by definition God cannot sin without contradiction. In order to sin, God would have to stop being God. In other words, God is sinless by definition. [END-CITE]I can't help but think of [this picture](http://i.imgur.com/HBeP8dS.jpg?1). God cannot sin because sinning is defined around the idea of closeness to god. If being unable to fulfill a logical contradiction means that one doesn't have free will, then it's not a meaningful concept at all - we could make one up for literally every possible person. I can't do un-/u/stevegcook things on account of being /u/stevegcook, yet presumably I don't lose my free will as a result. [STA-CITE]>I also have a problem with the counter argument that states: 'we have the ability to sin, but we just choose not to'. This would only work if there is only a finite passage of time. If there is zero possibility of us sinning, then we do not have the ability to sin. Since we have the ability to sin (via free will), then there must be a non-zero possibility of us sinning. It might be infinitesimally small, but mathematically, given an infinite passage of time, it must occur. [END-CITE]Sinning isn't something that happens randomly. You previously asserted that the likelihood of sinning being nonzero is based on having free will alone, but that's not quite true. It also requires an impure soul separated from God, something which is no longer the case upon entering heaven. As such, the probability of sinning becomes zero over any length of time.
[luxo42]
[STA-CITE]> I can't help but think of this picture. God cannot sin because sinning is defined around the idea of closeness to god. If being unable to fulfill a logical contradiction means that one doesn't have free will, then it's not a meaningful concept at all - we could make one up for literally every possible person. I can't do un-/u/stevegcook things on account of being /u/stevegcook, yet presumably I don't lose my free will as a result. [END-CITE]If we defined free will as the ability to do something other than what you yourself would do, then yes this would be a problem. However, that's not how I defined free will. Free will is defined as the ability to choose to sin or not sin. God only loses his free will because he cannot choose to sin. [STA-CITE]>Sinning isn't something that happens randomly. You previously asserted that the likelihood of sinning being nonzero is based on having free will alone, but that's not quite true. It also requires an impure soul separated from God, something which is no longer the case upon entering heaven. As such, the probability of sinning becomes zero over any length of time. [END-CITE]I responded to this fully in my edit, but here it is again briefly. According to Christianity, sin must exist in this world in order for us to have free will. If free will can exist without the possibility of sin, then it removes the necessity for sin. Then I would ask you, why does sin exist?
[stevegcook]
[STA-CITE]> Free will is defined as the ability to choose to sin or not sin. God only loses his free will because he cannot choose to sin. [END-CITE]The definition of "sin" is dependent on what God is/does. As a parallel, if the word *"nis"* meant *"things that /u/luxo42 never does"* then it would equally true that you couldn't *nis*, by definition. By making up this word/definition of a thing you can't do, did I just take away your free will? Of course not. You would be no less capable of taking any action you otherwise could have taken, the concept of *nissing* simply becomes incoherent when applied to you. Same thing with God. [STA-CITE]>Then I would ask you, why does sin exist? [END-CITE]During our mortal lives on earth, our souls are imperfect/impure/tainted/etc. Sinning happens because of this, and free will, *in combination.* Those in heaven are still physically able to sin, but their souls are now pure and one with God, leaving them with absolutely zero desire to do so. No chance involved - those whose souls are completely one with God do not want to sin. Full stop. A note - I don't believe any of this is *true,* as I am an atheist. However, within the context of Christian doctrine, it is perfectly plausible.
[CalmQuit]
If being in heaven means you don't ever want to sin and the concept of sin is based on what god does, doesn't that mean god makes you have the exact same desires as he does? If that's not what you'd want to do without him intervening that's pretty much the definition of taking away free will (just think of hypnosis).
[stevegcook]
Well, according to Christian doctrine, man was made in God's image - that much is pretty uncontested. Aside from that, though, I'm not sure if I would think of it like God opening up your brain with a chisel and taking away the part that makes you want to do stuff. It'd be more like how you experience things in your life, that make you change your views, tendencies, desires, opinions, etc. The experience of being so close to God cleanses your soul and restores you to the more pure state that humanity was originally in before its fall.
[MontiBurns]
[STA-CITE]>If sin is defined as going against God's will, then by definition God cannot sin without contradiction. [END-CITE]One definition of "Sin" is a greek term to "miss the mark." [here's the source](http://biblehub.com/greek/264.htm). So we should think of it as more to err or make a mistake rather than to violate god's will. This definition takes away a lot of the emotional and cultural baggage of the word. One of the biggest causes of sin is temptation. If we are free of temptation, then we wouldn't *want* to sin. In heaven, all of our basic needs would be met, we'd have lots of fun things to do, and no physical bodies. We wouldn't have a need to sin, and we'd have to go out of our way in order to sin. It's almost like a big, childproofed playroom. We're free to do what we want, but there's no sharp object or loose wires to hurt ourselves or others..
[luxo42]
Several people have had this response, so I added an edit to my original post. Basically adding another requirement for sin to occur removes the necessity for sin. If we don't need the possibility to sin in order to have free will, then why does sin need to exist?